IRAN WAR: This is World War III

As strikes between Iran, Israel, and the United States continue, the conflict is entering a dangerous new phase. What began as an exchange of missile attacks is quickly evolving into a broader regional confrontation with global consequences.

In this emergency episode of Conflict of Interest, ACLED CEO Clionadh Raleigh and media relations manager Bron Mills break down what the first ten days of the war reveal about strategy, escalation, and the risks ahead.

They discuss why this conflict has spread across more countries faster than almost any modern war, how missile and drone attrition could shape the battlefield, and what Iran’s new leadership means for the direction of the conflict. The conversation also explores the role of the IRGC, the limits of air power, and why running out of weapons may matter less than running out of political will.

Finally, they tackle the question many people around the world are asking: Are we witnessing the early stages of a world war?

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_01 0:00

If this isn't a world war, I don't know what would look like a world war. This is a marathon. These are long, complicated, bloody, tragic events. And we've just gotten started. So this is it. This is World War III. Conflicts of interest brought to you by Accled. Hello, everybody. Welcome to a new week of Conflict of Interest. My name is Cleaner Rowley. I'm the executive director of Accled. And today we are, as with the rest of the world, speaking again about Iran. Let me introduce Bron Mills.

SPEAKER_00 0:32

Yeah, thank you for having me back. So we are, again, like the rest of the world, keeping a very close eye on what's going on with Iran at the moment. And for me, it's all about the headlines. So we saw over the weekend with the Iranian president's apology to the Gulf Nations saying, you know, we're really sorry, but if you attack us, then we'll attack you. Otherwise, don't worry about it. Um, and then Trump standing by that we're going to continue to hit very hard. And everything I'm seeing, it seems like a list of targets. Any news update is not necessarily about progress in any way, other than, you know, this has been hit or this has been targeted. Realistically, how long can that part of this go on for?

SPEAKER_01 1:11

It can go on for a long time. A war of attrition, which is what this appears to be, it's uh it's effectively a war of missile attrition, can go on for as long as people have things to lob at each other. While the mid-range missiles, the ballistic missiles that Iran had were considered to be the biggest threat, and Israel has has done quite a lot of work at destroying missile launchers, um, reporting that they've destroyed at least 300 in the last nine days, and there's potentially between 100 and 200 left. What we're hearing just today is that a long-range, much more technologically sophisticated missile has just been sent into Israel from Iran. But I actually think that not only is it impossible to kind of give an estimate to the time, the the real danger here is the sheer number of short-range drones, etc., that are able to be thrown at each other. And so, yes, we could we could be looking at a very long air war, but I do want to mention two things that are quite important, which is that there's no question that Iran has in some ways given up air superiority, of course, to both Israel and the US. That's an important note, which is that the US and Israel are able to hit Iran as and when they wish. The second is that no one's going to win a war by throwing missiles at each other. So they can exhaust, let's say, their their defensive capabilities and their offensive capabilities, but no one's gonna win the war based on it.

SPEAKER_00 2:41

The reports that I've seen today are claiming that the analysts or the experts who are also looking at this, like yourself, are suggesting that the winner of this or the loser of this is gonna be decided on who runs out of weapons first. Is that something that that you see being the case?

SPEAKER_01 2:59

That's never been the case before, and I don't think it's gonna be the case now. But this stage of the war is an air superiority war. And it's also about driving up the costs, like who can take it, right? Which is why there's been so many attacks on neighbors by Iran. You know, one of the one of the things that I think is most important about this conflict is that in in the whole history of Accled, and I'm pretty sure the whole history of most of any um conflict studies, this war has diffused the fastest, as in it it's encapsulated the highest number of countries in the shortest period of time within it. And so all that does is drive up the costs of it continuing more and more and more. Of course, there's economic costs being suffered by all parties. And so there's lots of ways to fight a war, but there are maybe fewer ways to to win it, and it's not with any of the things we're seeing there.

SPEAKER_00 3:53

No, and and the main word that's popping up in all of the searches that I'm doing, it seems to be all about interception, right? So we're recording X number on X targets, and whichever, I mean, how many are making contact, how many aren't making contact. And is that is that another kind of key here?

SPEAKER_01 4:12

Well, so the reports that I've seen indicate that a key part of the Iranian strategy was to exhaust the interception abilities of both the Gulf and especially Israel and the US bases, of course, within this last period, so it's nine, ten days, and then it would start to continue to hit. There's certainly indications that interception abilities are decreasing, but there's also indications that the number of missiles coming out of Iran are decreasing. So all sorts of propaganda to some degree are also like, and legitimate strategy coming into play here. It's simply not possible to discern a pattern or even a change in a pattern in such a small period of time when what's quite clear is that in Iran, decisions are being made at perhaps different scales. There's still, of course, a central command, but there's also indications that more rogue elements are taking it upon themselves to do some of the more surprising bombing that we're seeing, and that they are changing their strategy, especially as I just mentioned, potentially with regard to long-range missiles, because of the limitations now of the mid-range missile strategy.

SPEAKER_00 5:20

So talking about strategy from missiles and weapons to the other side of this, which is what they're actually targeting, it seems that's where the conversation is at the moment, and whether that's civilians or kind of military bases, how much kind of agreement has to go into that? What sense of cohesion is there?

SPEAKER_01 5:36

Well, on the Israeli-US side, they have divided the country, and in part they've divided the targets. The Israelis are mainly focused on the West and the center, increasingly a little bit in the north, and they are going after military infrastructure for sure, and military positions. The US is believed to be operating, and of course there's a lot of evidence to suggest it's operating more in the south, and it's going after more reliably active missile areas and very significant IRGC areas within that region. But I will say that there's been a shift in tone recently about some of the targeting, whether it's on energy infrastructure or on what's considered to be classic civilian infrastructure like desalinization plants. There are some rumors, of course, that the US is increasingly going to be targeting or Israel might target oil refineries or effectively like the the basis of some of the Iranian economy. And there's been a lot of warnings not to do that. And of course, there's been a lot, a lot of warnings yesterday about desalinization, not just in Iran, but the region more broadly, because of the attack on Bahrain's desalination plant yesterday.

SPEAKER_00 6:47

So has the oil and energy infrastructure conversations has that got anything to do with the what we're hearing about Russia and Ukraine kind of putting putting their hands up?

SPEAKER_01 6:59

What I've what I've understood is that Russia has assisted Iran in the strike precision of US positions and that Ukraine has offered assistance with again kind of interception and more irrelated attacks and missiles. Honestly, I think everybody kind of wants to make sure that they're they're having some role in this, especially because they can see the benefit, I think, of not just directly on Iran or or Iran and its allies, who have been relatively quiet up until recently on the larger region. I think everybody is just very freaked out at the regional nature of this and it being so quick. And its ramifications being so obvious, you know, whether it's the oil price or the cessation of shipping in the straits or the cost of this war and and its intensity. I think a a lot of people are a lot of people in a lot of places want to participate.

SPEAKER_00 7:50

Yeah, it feels to me from again a news perspective that for the first time with this more than any other, there have been more leaders around the world kind of stepping up, speaking out, picking a side, or who's saying, I'm definitely against this, or I don't agree with this. And as you say, is that to do with the regional impact and what it might mean for industry and economies and energy and all of those kind of bigger themes?

SPEAKER_01 8:11

I think also the, you know, what I've seen, especially in the UK press, is this sense that the Dubai or maybe the Qatari dream has been burst and that the Gulf states are going to have to come to terms with the fact that they're no longer going to be considered a safe haven, an economic safe haven or a tax safe haven, or in any way safe for as long as this continues, or some remnant of the Iranian system believes that they are playing a role in their destruction. So, you know, no matter what Iranian regime may survive this, the relationships between their nearest neighbors are are going to be difficult enough that getting back to what Dubai or Doha or you know those places were kind of known for is going to be extremely difficult. And you know, you can't be a global aviation hub if people don't believe it's safe to fly in or out of your airports.

SPEAKER_00 9:06

I think that that speaks to there was the the spiteful side of the British press as well. There's there was something that I read that said um, you know, the people moved to those places to avoid paying tax, and now tax money is being used to get them sent back. It's that kind of it's all kind it's all looking a little bit different, isn't it, in that part of the world now?

SPEAKER_01 9:24

Yeah, it's a lot of Schadenfreude. But but I would also say that in particular the UK response, there there's a lot of miscommunications, both over the Chagos Island deal in the first place, but also, of course, how Keir Starmer goes about engaging with, let's say, international relations was considered a success. But actually, it's quite awkward when you're dealing with Trump, because I think that no answer other than yes is the right answer, and that can be impossible for a lot of leaders. Even especially somebody as vague and kind of decisionless as Keir Stomer, the UK didn't seem all that concerned about, for example, responding to Cyprus or getting their citizens out of those places, which doesn't bode well for their role within an increasingly violent world where where you have to make decisions quite quickly and you're going to need to be able to react much better than I think what this showing demonstrated.

SPEAKER_00 10:17

Yeah, and it's quite the different showing to the the other world leaders who have made their position and and picked their side quite clear. Speaking of leaders, Iran themselves have a have a replacement now. And I know the the last time we spoke, we said, you know, the problem with picking a leader is you know they're they have a target on their back now. So what do we know about this? And does having does having someone at the helm in this way, is that gonna make any difference for this one?

SPEAKER_01 10:40

Uh a few things about this leader. Of course, he's the son of the previous leader. He was a somewhat controversial choice. Certainly there wasn't unanimous agreement. One of the reasons he was a controversial choice is because, of course, as the son, he violates something that seemed to be quite sacred to the Islamic regime, which was that there was not going to be kind of familial succession within the system. He's not a religious scholar, so he doesn't have that heft that would have been so important previously in the in the choosing of a leader. He's really been kind of damned by faint praise. I think people think that he's a bit of a nutter, to be honest. Um, there was an interesting article recently in The Atlantic where um he was referred to as the most dangerous man in the world. Part of that danger is certainly he's going to feel the need for retribution. He lost his father in the attack on the very first day of the conflict, as well as his mother, his wife, his nephew, I believe, and many others who were close to him. I will say that so him aside and his intensity about dealing with the US, what is very clear from what happened here is that the IRCG has retained quite a bit of control or military control, even of this implied, you know, supreme positioning. What we're seeing a lot of in reports is Lari Jani, who is the secretary of the Supreme Council, is the person who's obviously making quite a number of decisions and steering this ship. And he's quite a sophisticated person, has been involved in a lot of the nuclear negotiations, has had several different senior positions within the IRGC and elsewhere, and he seems both pragmatic and quite clear about the existential crisis that faces the regime at the moment.

SPEAKER_00 12:24

In past conflicts, we know there's been these sort of rules in which they don't want people speaking about it, filming has been banned, communicating outside, letting anyone in on the kind of specifics around attacks and things like that has been in place. Do we know if that's the case this time and what the kind of purpose and value is of that?

SPEAKER_01 12:41

Our Iranian experts are saying that there is, of course, a continued internet shutdown within Iran, and that that is one reason why there's relatively decent reporting from places like Tehran where they can reach Starlink from inside. And of course, the reporting that's coming from Israel and the US, you know, it's quite different and it it's going to be selective. But in terms of what's happening within Iran, one, I don't think it's homogeneous throughout the country. I think there's a very different reaction in different parts of the country to what's happening. And two, I think that it's also unclear to the people involved inside, you know, because we're hearing on one end that, especially with the appointment of the new Supreme Leader, that there is a reassertion of the command and control. And as I mentioned, that there there are still very senior, very knowledgeable people in charge at a senior level. Then we're also hearing uh something that I wrote about recently in the Rolley report about the Mosaic doctrine, which is that there is effectively a decentralized form of military strategy and military actions throughout the s throughout the country. And I would imagine that both are true at the same time, and that both are not completely true. But I will say that it is obvious, especially given the the political turmoil just this weekend with the president saying one thing and then being kind of pulled back and having to retract his statements, that there is not a consistency, there's not a lot of alignment between what's happening at the very senior level, which you would totally expect given the level of change that's occurred within the country within the last 10 days. And furthermore, that there is absolutely no way, under any possibility, that the Iranian civilians should be expected to, quote, rise up and overtake, you know, a military state. It's insanity to have expected it, to be encouraging it. If this system falls, it's going to fall from within, or it's going to fray from within the IRGC, because there is no other options about how it might, how it might fray. And what we're seeing at the moment is that that realization is starting to hit people, both inside and out, right? So, you know, a few days ago, it was the Kurds who were going to somehow enter the country and inspire civilian insurgency, which was always nonsense. The Kurds have thought twice about this because of the risks it poses to not only them, but the relationships that they've fostered in the region in the last decade or so. The balloon potential from the south from Pakistan, that's also a bit of a a damp idea, I'll put it, like that. Um what's missing here, I think, about some of the early reactions, especially from the US, is a recognition that the system itself, where the IRGC controls, of course, all of the security, all of the military abilities, but equally, of course, has a real stranglehold on the economy and through the local forces of uh has a has a huge amount of population control. It's very difficult to sustain that in these conditions. It's equally difficult to try to dismantle it.

SPEAKER_00 15:39

Was there a genuine expectation, do you think, from Trump that there he could do this kind of rally cry and and have all of these different parties kind of jump on his team?

SPEAKER_01 15:50

Sure. I would say that like the amount of thought that Trump gives to the specifics or the, let's say, the processes of foreign policy is pushy limited. He is not making a decision or he's not making a series of decisions for a strategy based on deep knowledge of Iran or deep knowledge about the abilities and the obstacles of engaging with a country of this strength and this size. I think to some degree I wouldn't be surprised to hear that he was kind of sweet-talked into it, especially by Netanyahu, who has always had a much clearer objective and a much clearer strategy about what's going to happen and is willing to take those costs. Whether Israel is is one thing, but Netanyahu certainly was. You'll notice that the Israelis have never called for the people of Iran to rise up and somehow overtake the system. I think it was just kind of a it sounded good at the time, is the only explanation I might have had for it.

SPEAKER_00 16:43

Something I like to do. I like to look up the most Google questions about something. So it's like where is the the public understanding about this? And one of them is whether this is going to turn into a world war. And I think that largely maybe contributing to um how people are feeling about this. They understand that there is talk about other countries' involvement. There is talk about international industries and and basic energy infrastructure for a and and they kind of gather the enormity of the region, but the specifics are maybe the bit that's getting getting lost on a lot of people.

SPEAKER_01 17:15

You know, assigning what a world war is is like asking how long a piece of string is, right? I mean, if this isn't a world war, I don't know what would look like a world war. It's involving all parts of the world to some degree. It has the potential of creating, you know, again, a massive problem in a very potentially vulnerable and sensitive region. Syria has just been, at least placated for the moment. Iraq has been contained, although it's still quite violent within. The idea that Iran would suffer consequences like Syria or suffer a conflict like Syria is certainly not going to be contained with any stretch of the imagination. So that means that the Gulf and the idea of the Gulf, the role that it would play in our current both economy but also in the popular imagination is done. China's ability to sustain itself with resources and energy, of course, is very much an open question. Russia's engagement with this conflict, Russia opening up as a potential new market for oil and being able to sustain its actions in Ukraine. It has all sorts of ramifications. So yes, I think it's here now. So this is it. This is World War III.

SPEAKER_00 18:25

I was gonna say, if I was going to use anybody I know to find the definition of what a world war is, I would come to you. And if that is the definition, I think that's do you know what I mean? Not sure that's a good thing. Well, I think it is. Because it's it's like, okay, it's the place of patterns and watching the behaviour and what impacts what else and how things expand and who's involved. And so because curiosity often gets the better, I have just Googled. A world war is a widespread international conflict involving most of the world's major powers characterized by direct large-scale combat across multiple continents and oceans.

SPEAKER_01 19:03

Yeah, but I would also say that like one of the things I think about is you've got the kind of central, you've got the primary conflicts, and then you have a number of secondary conflicts, right? So when I was told this weekend that, for example, the Ethiopians are taking young men in the evenings to be recruited and trained because they're going to potentially try another assault either in Tigrae or by distance to the to the Eritreans, it made me think, well, they're doing this because they think people are distracted. Although they're also doing it because they think that UAE will support them in order to kind of realign, let's say, their Horn of Africa focus. But what happens here, and this is, I think, one of the most important things that people should recognize, what happens in conflicts that are this size and this complex, these revolutions, is that everybody's position changes, not just once, but several times within the course of the conflict. And these are a lot, this is a marathon. These are a long, complicated, bloody, tragic events. And we've just gotten started.

SPEAKER_00 20:07

What's next then? What happens now?

SPEAKER_01 20:09

Well, I mean, the conflict has broadened and deepened. There's no question about that. I think the Gulf states are not, you know, what's been considered the soft underbelly. It will be an open question about whether or not Israel has been hit by these long-range missiles and whether or not they will continue to be, because that will have a massive effect, I think, on the existential crisis Israel feels like it's under as a result. I think Iran's strategy to keep on what it sees, I think, as of defending itself by throwing literally everything at everybody at the same time, is going to be refined internally. Now that there's some sense about how they've reconstituted some of the command and control. I I think the big open question here is whether the US will capitulate to oil prices rather than the progress of the war and the cost of this war. So again, I also I know I keep on saying this, it's early days. Oh, it's 10 days in. So there is no pattern yet, is how I put it. One of the additional elements I think to keep in mind is that there's been some discussion about whether the US or of course whether Israel might be interested in taking over or invading Karg Island, which is of course the oil transportation and facilitation spot in Iran that is propping up the Iranian economy and is fundamental to Iran's ability to finance this conflict. It's just rumors at the moment, but should that come to pass, again, the Iranian regime will be squeezed to a degree that it will have to make other choices and change its strategy.

SPEAKER_00 21:38

Okay, well, we're not ruling anything out then, but whatever does happen next, I'm sure we'll be back for another chat. So thank you again for having me.

SPEAKER_01 21:46

Thank you for all the work, of course, that AccLED is doing. We're coding the conflict daily. The experts that we have on Iran are really phenomenal, as is, of course, the communications around it. So thank you.

SPEAKER_00 22:00

You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest, brought to you by ACLED with Professor Clina Raleigh and Dr. Katrina Dowd. New episodes are available every fortnight. Follow ACLED socials for more in the meantime.