IRAN WAR: The regional war with global consequences

The Iran war is more than a regional conflict.

In this episode of Conflicts of Interest, Bron Mills and ACLED CEO Clionadh Raleigh examine how the war between Iran, Israel, and the United States is expanding beyond the battlefield, affecting global energy markets, regional alliances, oil supply and the wider international system.

They discuss the growing tensions around the Strait of Hormuz, where threats to shipping and oil supply are raising global economic concerns, as well as the continued strikes targeting military infrastructure inside Iran.

The conversation explores:

• Why the conflict is widening rather than slowing
• How disruptions to oil and shipping could affect the global economy
• Why countries like the UK, Japan, Australia and the EU are hesitant to become involved
• and what “success” actually looks like for the actors involved in the war.

As the conflict spreads across the region and its consequences ripple outward, one thing is becoming clear: the impact of this war is being felt far beyond the Middle East.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

There is a very clear agenda on the part of the Iranians to potentially mine the Strait of Hormuz, which is a very serious issue, but also to be selective about who can go through the strait. This conflict is widening, not narrowing, not ending. Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED. Hello, everybody. Welcome to another episode of Conflicts of Interest with me, Cleaner Raleigh and Bron Mills.

SPEAKER_01 0:31

I have been away for a while. I think it's been a week since you and I spoke last, but things have been moving pretty quickly. All the headlines I've been seeing are around the news strikes, more drones, and then the oil prices, right? And I think that the one thing that is clear to me is that the impacts are so far reaching from this. In my house, it's petrol and two of the Grand Prix being cancelled. If we're talking about all of the headlines today, they all seem to be about the Strait of Hormuz and having those supply chains cut off. What does that mean at the moment? Where are we with that?

SPEAKER_00 1:05

Well, I think over the weekend there's been all sorts of things happening at the local level, at the national level, especially within Iran, the regional level, especially as you mentioned, whether it's Karg Island or the uh Gulf states or the hits on Israel or potential ground invasion planned for Lebanon, and then internationally, which is how people are grappling with some of the first order effects of this conflict, not just in oil prices, but also in kind of potential geopolitical realignments that are in the wind, you might say. So, yes, it's been busy. This conflict is widening, not narrowing, not ending.

SPEAKER_01 1:46

So there's also been um a report about a Turkish owned ship being allowed through. That's that's been kind of circulating today. And I think the questions around that are how does that selectivity work and then the knock-on effects from that and then and how that's being kind of policed and patrolled?

SPEAKER_00 2:01

So that's a great question. Last week we talked a little bit about how Iran had actually upped its oil trade since this war started, and it was presumed that that was going to China. But that's why there had been quite a number of attacks on Karg Island in order to stop this financialization of the conflict that was happening for Iran through that medium and location. But there is a very clear agenda on the part of the Iranians to potentially mine the Strait of Hormuz, which is a very serious issue, but also to be selective, as you mentioned, about who can go through the strait. Apparently, ships had been, or oil tankers had been claiming that they were in fact Chinese in order to get through. That was always a um an allowable strategy. Now, of course, Turkey being also able to get things through. The Laranjani, who is now, I believe, the secretary of the Supreme Council, came out and he said, if you are unalied or unaffiliated, you know, you can use the strait, and if you are not, you cannot. So we will see about how that strategy holds up. There are alternatives for getting out some of these resources, of course, but nothing that is as efficient or or kind of well documented as the strait.

SPEAKER_01 3:19

And the threats from from Trump have been the future could be very bad for NATO if there isn't a kind of support in the reopening of the strait. What does he mean by that threat?

SPEAKER_00 3:32

I think he just wants to spread the costs of this out a bit more to people who are hoping to not suffer from the consequences of this conflict. The US and and particularly President Trump has had a really odd engagement with entities like NATO or other allies, which is that he insults them up until they don't do what he wants, and then he threatens them to do it because they're already in an alliance. And that has seen some very clear limitations, or that strategy on his part has seen some very clear limitations recently, which is that the US isn't seen as a reliable partner in a very changeable circumstance. And so whether it's the UK or, you know, other NATO partners and allies, they are unwilling to rush into this, not knowing whether or not they're going to be left holding the bag on the Strait of Hormuz or anywhere else. It's a real threat that the US will just take their toys and leave versus stick this out to the end that's suitable for for all.

SPEAKER_01 4:38

Because we've seen Japan and Australia saying firmly we're not planning to send any ships. And then Keir Starmer today, right now even at the time of recording, said um he's planning to stand firm. There is not going to be any any support in that sense from the UK. So what's Trump expecting?

SPEAKER_00 4:57

I think he's expecting everybody to pile in to help out what are, you know, probably pretty exhausted, not not in any sense that they're not going to be able to go on, but exhausted US and Israeli militaries. But I mean, yet again, I think Keostama is pretty cheeky to be going on about things like that. In part because the UK is involved in this conflict, even if it doesn't want to be, you know, whether it's a hit on the the uh infrastructure in Cyprus or whether it's UK citizens, you know, living in the Gulf, they are affected. And so despite the endless bloody politics of the internal Labour Party and whether or not you voted for the Iraq war during your student days, that's not going to really hold when the UK is trying to claim that it has some sort of a global role. But all it can say is that, like, oh, not yet, or not quite, or not really, as a as a response. But what Trump wants effectively is for people to help out. He thinks that they're they've got economic self-interest to do so, and he's not wrong, but in response, they would say, You didn't check with us before you did this. So it's a bit rich now asking us for help because you've gotten yourself into a bit of bother.

SPEAKER_01 6:10

Yeah, and I think that's the other thing, isn't it, that comes with the more it impacts that everyday people, so not necessarily the military, but I saw a whole news piece. It was the BBC, and basically people were saying, I always put£20 in my car, but this time I broke down on the way home. And I mean, I thought it was an interesting angle, but that level of direct impact on these people are now starting to pay attention to maybe things that they wouldn't before and therefore expect a little bit more from their government.

SPEAKER_00 6:39

Maybe I would say that the oil price fluctuates, right? We had a fluctuation when Russia invaded Ukraine, and people are certainly able to stomach it, especially now, you know, it's getting nicer. There's spring, and there won't be such a call on those resources. I think that what people may miss the most eventually is what the Gulf represented, the kind of confidence of the Gulf, the potential location to move to, uh to holiday in, to represent a changing Middle East. That's all in question at the moment. And, you know, so too are whether or not people want to remain dependent on resources like oil and gas. And so there's all sorts of, you know, second, third order effects of this conflict that we'll likely see years from now rather than immediately.

SPEAKER_01 7:28

If you look at the UAE and the headlines saying, you know, there's please, isn't there for expats to not take any pictures and and not make I mean, that's certainly something that's got a lot of attention over the last couple of days. What what's that about?

SPEAKER_00 7:42

So the UAE has been really hit by this. You know, second to Israel, and of course Iran, the UAE has been a particular focus of Iran, and they have an image to project that Iran is seriously hurting. And so not capturing images of destruction and the problems that this war is certainly causing within UAE, Qatar, etc., is important for them to be able to control this message, which is that they have it under control. So there's been some discussion this weekend that despite the fact that the actual missile strikes out of Iran have decreased substantially, so too have some of the interception rates within some countries. So there was this discussion late last week about how interception is becoming exhausted, and there is some degree of support for that. But equally, Iran can't magic missiles whenever it wants to. It is also becoming exhausted, and and it has been severely, severely hit with these strikes, and their ability to engage in large-scale and persistent strikes has been severely degraded and damaged. So I don't want to give the impression that Iran is kind of like deciding the trajectory of the war here. They're doing what they can, whether it is by having a much stronger presence within the Strait of Hormuz or sending drones, etc., to to near Gulf states to give the impression that they're still in this very much.

SPEAKER_01 9:12

And I I read something last week that was talking about how Iran won't know how well they've done until the end, because it's about kind of maintenance and and and the kind of comparative strategies there. And as far as the the strategy taking the turn at the moment, what are we seeing as far as I mean, that approach, A, but also the types of targeting that's happening now?

SPEAKER_00 9:33

So I would say that the kind of word on Iran at the moment, I guess, outside of Iran, is that all they need to do is survive, right? And then they will have quote one. And I think that's there's some elements of that that's true, right? Just being able to survive this barrage is going to be super important. But that implies that, like, this is all that's there, right? An air war, maybe some maritime attacks, and then it's finished. But I don't think that that is, in fact, what the end point is, either for the US or Israel or for Iran. There is still an awful lot of attention, as there should be, of course, on attacks within Iran and what they're meant to degrade. Tehran has been the main strike focus, about 34% of all attacks, in about 60 locations, which is reflecting the concentration of military infrastructure, paramilitary infrastructure in the capital. And then, you know, that goes down and down, down, depending on all 31 provinces after that. But when we think about what has been hit most frequently within Iran, it's IRGC bases and headquarters. There's been over 300 fatalities that are confirmed from that. So a lot of the people and the infrastructure of the internal state of Iran has been attacked. And we don't necessarily focus on that when we're focused on the Strait of Hormuz or Dubai or wherever the case, but it's going to have a serious effect on their ability to continue operating like a military dictatorship, which they certainly are. So outside of the IRGC bases, you've got military bases and installations that have been attacked. They've got naval and port infrastructure, police and security facilities, airports and air bases, and of course, just any place that there are missiles have been attacked very, very substantially. So I would say to not call this war too early is a really, really important part. In fact, from the very beginning, people have said this is only really going to end when people are sure that the Iranians can either hold up the regime or whether or not the regime is significantly degraded and potentially destroyed, which I think destroyed is off the table, but significantly degraded is not. And I think that there's going to be still a continued effort to do it. There's been talk about ground invasions, and if there isn't a ground invasion, it's much more likely to be directed towards nuclear facilities. And there were some reports yesterday, I'll have to I'll have to find the reference about where they would be most likely. But, you know, that's a whole new, very, very big escalatory phase that we don't know of yet.

SPEAKER_01 12:12

Yeah, and it's interesting, isn't it, the way that that kind of narrative has come away from Iran specifically, and then it's that rest of the world. What does the end look like? And it's kind of scenario planning, isn't it, because of the impacts being felt so so far and wide. And there was a piece that has come out today that's talking about what success looks like for each of the actors involved. So it's suggesting that with Washington, it ends with the collapse of the regime and that being swiftly replaced by something really nice and peaceful, or at very least, uh damaging of that republic. The suggestion for the Israelis is that they are probably in the least hurry to end the war, is the quote they use. And then the Gulf states saying the suggestion there is they once thought they could live with the Islamic Republic just across the water, but until now. So I don't think that is especially clear on success. What do they what does everybody want? And is anyone actually in agreement with each other?

SPEAKER_00 13:10

Yeah, I mean, I would agree with quite a lot of that. What the US wants is a quick success. It's not getting it. So it will probably reframe what it can get as a big success. And that will almost certainly disappoint the Israelis if should it come to pass, but it will be some sort of a compromise on the part of the um the Iranians, but one that endangers probably everybody else, right? Because they will get more radical. So the Israelis, of course, want this regime to be unable to function as it has been. They don't want regional militias, nuclear weapons, or far-reaching ballistic weapons. So effectively, they want it to be a neighbor in the sense that the others are. You don't necessarily have to love Israel, but one of your core tenants can't be the threatening of this state. So, but the I think what's super interesting is what the Gulf wants, they, you know, they want for this to never have happened, but what what it will likely happen is potentially more intra-gulf cooperation without Iran. But they are looking at a huge amount of containment for any sort of Iranian regime. Even if, you know, the West got exactly what it wanted and and for some reason there was a really neutered Iranian government, right? It would still represent a threat to its immediate neighbors. There'd still be extremist elements within the country, with potentially within the government. But anything even beyond that just means more of a threat to the Gulf rather than less of a threat. So I mean it's kind of bad news all around, I would say.

SPEAKER_01 14:38

I know last week we mentioned Kag Island briefly, didn't we? Because I think the reports was just kind of trickling through that that something was going on in in that area. And that has had the impact that you projected at that point broadly. Could you summarize that and and what the kind of knock-on effects have been?

SPEAKER_00 14:57

So there were reports this morning that in fact Iran is still able to use the island, despite the hits, that it hasn't destroyed those facilities. But I don't think that it was ever intending on destroying the facilities, in part because it's very clear that destroying some of this really key infrastructure, whether it's oil and gas related or whether it's desalinization, it comes with an extremely high future cost or a potentially high immediate cost to civilians. So what the US is trying to do with the Carg Island attacks was to limit the financialization of this conflict, right? And that is true to some respect, but I would also say that, you know, quite a lot of what's going on at the moment is already existing stockpiles, etc. So that's going to be the biggest way that this conflict continues rather than, you know, money in the bank that they can use to pay people. I guess I wouldn't be too concerned about that right now on the list of things to be worried about. But they have a very easy job to protect Carg Island or to protect the resources there because it's so close to the mainland, rather than it being an air target for the US. So I would say that there are potentially other ways to make both the Strait of Hormuz safer and to make the Iranians understand the costs of their continued barrage on neighboring states and the strait without resorting to attacks on that vital infrastructure.

SPEAKER_01 16:28

So you mentioned there what doesn't feature on the list of things to worry about at the moment. Could you finish off today by saying what what is on the list of things to worry about at the moment?

SPEAKER_00 16:37

I would say the last few days have really given kind of um a boost to Iran's strategy. And if we try to separate the fact that, like, you know, some of this is just propaganda, right? But it's propaganda from all parties, not just Iran by any stretch of the imagination. I would say that the l that we have not seen any sort of internal dissension that I think that many would have wanted to see by now. And I don't mean, as I've mentioned before, I don't mean Iranians coming out to overthrow the regime. I always thought that was a ridiculous idea and extremely dangerous for people who've already put up with so much danger from this regime. No, what I mean is is some sort of sense that there was a fraying either of this mosaic doctrine or there was a fraying of the ability for people to perform their security work, whether it's in the paramilitary forces in Iran or the police or the military or the IRGC. And we're not seeing that in particular. There were protests over the weekend that were very well attended, but I, again, I think that that was largely propaganda. I think that that they had there has been a decline in missile rates. That's really important, right? There should be a focus on continuing to destroy the missile abilities of Iran. That should be very, very high on the list. But also, I think letting letting Israel's strategy play out in our minds, we might think to ourselves that we should start seeing some sign of internal dissension or breakdown, might be the better way to put it, relatively soon. Another thing that's high on the list of things to worry about is whether or not there will be even a even a very targeted ground invasion and how that in fact could escalate. That's quite important, and how the Gulf itself is going to continue to intercept what will be opportunistic but pretty constant threats from Iran through drones. That's also a really important aspect. I mean, running out of drones or running out of missiles, which I think is unlikely given that we've seen conflicts such as Russia, Ukraine, etc., have been able to sustain this, you know, quite high level of air activity and drone activity years into this conflict. So I think Iran is happy to use every last thing it has, but that might last a really long time. So we should be prepared for what it looks like when you do get potentially a bit of a breakdown and you still have elements that are trying to internationalize the conflict and broaden it. So that's the biggest issue. It's become so much broader in its implication, but also in its geography and also in its impact than I think people would have thought two weeks ago.

SPEAKER_01 19:15

Yeah, no, absolutely. And given that broadening position, I know you and I have caught up about this. I think this is the fourth time. And so because of how far-reaching it is, I think that we're next time on conflicts of interest, we're gonna get some more expertise, aren't we?

SPEAKER_00 19:30

Yes, I'm very excited about this. On Wednesday, we're going to speak about what's happening in Iraq, what's happening in Yemen, and what's happening in Lebanon. In order to really understand, you know, one of the key pillars of Iranian security were these proxy militias across the the Middle East. It was one of the reasons that Iran was considered such a pariah in that region. So it's really important to realize, too, that like Iran was no big power in the Middle East before. It remains not a big power now. It's quite economically depressed, it's very badly run, it gave a lot of its money to a nuclear program that to date, thankfully, has not been completed. It also gave quite a bit of its money to these proxy militias that caused unrelenting amounts of trouble to other countries. There's quite a lot against Iran somehow getting its act together and being able to either successfully complete this war, not just survive, but successfully in their minds, and get anywhere near what they're asking, which is a reconsideration of the security guarantees and arrangements in the Middle East.

SPEAKER_01 20:33

Yeah, no, absolutely. So I'll be back where I belong on the other side of the screen, but I'm really looking forward to hearing that chat.

SPEAKER_00 20:40

Yeah, and it's always nice to have you on this side of the chat. Well, thank you very much, Braun, and we will catch up on Wednesday.

SPEAKER_01 20:47

You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest, brought to you by ACLED with Professor Cleaner Raleigh and Dr. Katrina Dowd. New episodes are available every fortnight. Follow ACLED socials for more in the meantime.