IRAN WAR: Iran Ceasefire Explained: How can everyone claim victory?

A ceasefire has been announced in the Iran war — but is this really de-escalation, or a strategic defeat for the United States and its allies?

In this episode of Conflicts of Interest, ACLED CEO Professor Clionadh Raleigh and Bron Mills break down the fragile Iran ceasefire, the unanswered questions around the deal, and why control of the Strait of Hormuz could leave Tehran in a stronger position than before.

They unpack what the reported terms may mean for Iran’s nuclear programme, Gulf security, Israel’s position, Lebanon, Hezbollah, oil markets, and the wider regional balance of power. With details still unclear and violence still threatening to continue, the bigger question is whether this is peace or just the end of one phase of the war.

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Transcript

SPEAKER_00 0:00

The ceasefire is welcome in one sense, but it's also maybe the worst point of this conflict that it's decided to cease. This will be the greatest strategic defeat of the US I can think of in living memory. Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED. Welcome again to Conflicts of Interest. My name is Professor Cleaner Raleigh, and I'm here today with the lovely Braun Mills to celebrate what might or might not be a ceasefire.

SPEAKER_01 0:28

I know, it's really taken over quite a lot of the headlines this morning, and I don't think I've ever quite seen so many people tuning into some of these live news blogs. And it's all about the ceasefire in general, of course, but this has been a kind of frantic diplomacy, it seems. And Iran has agreed to reopen the Strait of Humuz. Negotiations are expected to kind of continue in Pakistan. But in the last sort of couple of minutes, Vice President J.D. Vance has already warned the deal could be a fragile ceasefire. And from your perspective, does that look like a genuine concern that he's got? Is this a real kind of hand breathe moment for everybody?

SPEAKER_00 1:07

Well, I mean, on a on his own personal note, it might be considered a bit of hedging just because he's been responsible for this late night negotiation, from what I understand. But all all ceasefires are conditional, of course. And I think that what he's actually reacting to is the very real perception amongst people that the US capitulated here because it didn't actually manage to get anything out of Iran that Iran hadn't already said was the case, as in, you know, the kind of standard operating procedure. The Strait of Hormuz can open, but it has to be negotiated with, and I believe paid a toll paid to the Iranian military in order to facilitate safe passage. There is a bill going through the Iranian parliament at the moment, which is meant to effectively manage transit across the strait to kind of consolidate and institutionalize that control with Oman. And so very it's very clear that the Iranians still consider the Strait of Hormuz their main kind of center of gravity, and that they can use that both to escalate the military concerns with the conflict, but they can also escalate the cost to the global population by continuing to control it. So it's not great for the states. I mean, if they capitulate on really any of the 10 points that have been used as, let's say, the fodder for conversation in Pakistan or between Pakistan through the US and Iran, then this will be the greatest strategic defeat of the US I can think of in living memory. I mean, and I I don't mean that loosely, I just mean that the ceasefire is welcome in one sense, but it's also maybe the worst point of this conflict that it's decided to cease.

SPEAKER_01 3:01

And so when what do we actually know about the ceasefire? Because I think there's declarations that it's a victory for the states, then there's a conversation about what's happening with the strait and how that still will be monitored by Iran, which to me doesn't feel too dissimilar to what the situation was anyway. Like what are the the kind of terms?

SPEAKER_00 3:23

So I think that those terms, and correct me if I'm wrong because I I was looking at it today, but I actually didn't see a lot of specific details for it. My understanding is that the strait remains open, but it needs to pass it, needs to be facilitated by Iran. And that is the only term people seem to be talking about, right? And then of course, Iran has their 10 points. Those are down from 15 points, I think, two days ago, right? The US a few days ago declared all 15 insane, nuts, and yet is willing to consider these 10, which aren't too much too much different. So I think that what we would consider this to be not necessarily a strategic pause on either of their sides, but rather kind of a reflection of the realities of the situation, which is that the US had spent yesterday bombing Carg Island because they want to cut off the financing of this conflict for Iran, allowing them to grow stronger through through their own trade. But it's handing them another opportunity to finance this conflict by allowing them to use the Strait of Hormuz as a toll booth. That's a very serious concern. You know, there's still missiles. There's at least a third of the original missile stockpile in Iran that has not been destroyed or damaged, is the best assessment. And yet, you know, there's nothing in there about Iran having to give that up, although they've already proven that a much cheaper drone is as useful to them as an expensively designed and uh and manufactured missile um missile silo. So that's another question altogether. And then, of course, the civilian infrastructure that has been damaged so far in Iran that will look like it it will survive, certainly this stage of the war. And it didn't look like that yesterday. But um, yeah, I think I don't know the terms. I don't know if anybody knows the terms. But I will say this, which is that we've noticed that some of the greatest increases in the missile exchange, the air war between Israel, the US, and Iran have occurred relatively recently, right? And so I would be very hesitant to assume that people are actually going to stop fighting simply because they haven't sorted or they haven't settled on what's going to happen in the Strait of Hormuz. There's a there's an awful lot of talking about one thing over here and actually doing another thing in direct defiance of that in a different place.

SPEAKER_01 6:01

Yeah, and I think that's the maybe the concerning part to many people would be how light on the on the detail as far as transparency goes or what we know about those 10 points. One of them that's been touched on in The Guardian is the nuclear rights and the acceptance of Iran's right to enrich uranium for peaceful purposes. I'm struggling to understand how President Trump can say that there's a victory whilst conceding that the nuclear rights, they're calling them peaceful purposes. Wasn't that the issue that started all of this?

SPEAKER_00 6:34

It was one of them, for sure. You know, a very big concern for Israel, of course, is the Iranian enrichment program. Marco Rubio came out uh a few days ago, gave a speech in which he spoke about nuclear work going on in Iran for the purposes of energy, what many countries are engaged in, and how Iran had abused that right or they had effectively given a false scenario about developing their nuclear facilities for energy rather than weapons. I think that um, you know, there's absolutely no question that this will now become much more important to Iran. Probably, you know, in whatever guise they want to talk about it, whether it's a deterrence ability or it's simply in order to make themselves or secure themselves as a regional hegemon. I think just on that note, one of the most important developments, I think, in all of this is how it's destroyed and reconfigured relationships within the Gulf itself. Saudi Arabia must think that this is possibly one of the worst-case scenarios if it stays as it is, right? And I'll and I'll come back to that in a second. You know, in one reading of this, it was the Saudis who asked the Pakistanis to get involved to try to facilitate some sort of a some sort of a ceasefire. In another way of looking at this, the Saudis cannot, under any circumstances, have an emboldened Iran in the region thinking of itself as the regional hedgem. We've discussed this on the podcast many times, in part because the region will be awash in Iranian-backed militias within a year. They will be able to rebuild their missile and nuclear facilities, thereby proving to be an even larger threat to their neighbors. And of course, they are they are trying to really change the future of the Gulf by their control of the Strait of Hormuz. And so the Saudis can't have it, UAE can't have it, etc. But so this is the worst-case scenario for them, especially if the US looks like it is going to capitulate andor leave, it leaves them totally exposed to this hardline regime. And I think that one of the ways that that they find common cause with Israel is that they need the weapons programs in Iran, whether it's the drones or the nuclear weapons, they are a they're not certainly of equal weight overall, but they're of they're of all a pressing concern to the neighbors at the moment because they are uh they are subject to all sorts of threats as a result of Iran's programs.

SPEAKER_01 9:14

So I'm just I've got the the Guardian piece in front because they seem to be reporting like what we do know. And so it looks like there was a lifting of all primary and secondary sanctions on Iran, continued Iranian control over the strait, US military withdrawal from the Middle East, end to attacks on Iran and allies, the release of frozen Iranian assets, and the UN Security Council resolution making any deal bindings. The the there's a follow-up note to it, which I think is quite interesting, and it says in the version released in Farsi, Iran also included the phrase acceptance of enrichment for its nuclear program. But for reasons that remain unclear, that phrase was missing in English versions shared by Iranian diplomats to journalists.

SPEAKER_00 9:57

But I think that the way to read that is one, this is a ceasefire that allows for the discussion about these terms. I think they're pretty still far away, even on agreeing what to agree on. But the 10-point Iranian plan includes certain maximalist demands that the US can't possibly agree to, including, for example, leaving the region. But in some ways, in some ways, you can read this ceasefire as a little bit of market manipulation. Obviously, it's had a really good effect on the energy markets, but also the stock market. But it allows us to ask some questions about what is going to happen with all those troops in the region that have just been moved there. Why would the financing of this conflict, which can continue and the financing of restocking their missiles, be stopped by a now emboldened regime who clearly thinks they've won. It seems to it seems false to me, and I can't quite I can't quite tell you this is the reason I think it's false, other than there's there's nothing there there except for two distrusted sides saying that they can come to some agreement.

SPEAKER_01 11:16

Yeah, so I think the line that the state is saying is about making room for diplomacy, right? So giving everyone an opportunity to have these talks. But as you say, uh oil went below$100 a barrel for the first time in days as a result of this, and the strikes that were recorded at Accled hit a kind of peak just beforehand. They hadn't gone as high at all so far. And so do you think then that this ceasefire just before that deadline to kind of escalate the war further, does this suggest to you a sort of genuine attempt at de-escalation, or simply that both sides feel it's within their strategy and their tactics to have this kind of pause now?

SPEAKER_00 11:57

I think it's much more likely that this is the end of this phase, this, let's say, this air phase of the conflict that has um that has emboldened the the regime in Iran. They certainly have come out of this far better on a political and a strategic level than than both the US and Israel. Of course, Israel and the US have come out on on top of this on a military level. And there's no denying the military successes of the past 40 days, but they are hollow when we think about what the situation is at the moment and what it looks like for the future, which is a global energy trade that is still that is still under Iran's control, if never more so. Like I was saying earlier, a gulf that is kind of on the precipice of being constantly potentially attacked. And also, really, the the variants of of what this could mean for stability in the Gulf, I think, are all bad rather than any potential good points. I think Israel is weaker today than it has been, even given the international condemnation of what happened in Gaza, and that's because they still are struggling with Hezbollah, despite the fact that Hezbollah has shown some some you know key limitations. They are still under attack from missiles both from Hezbollah, but also, of course, hopefully that is now ceased, but from Iran. They have lost a lot of control of their message and support in the US. I think that the global community is under the impression that Netanyahu led Trump into this, and so he is not he himself is going to suffer from this, and he has an election coming up that I think this was pretty pivotal to. So there'll be a lot of PR people working overtime to spin this message in a lot of capitals.

SPEAKER_01 13:59

And when you think about Israel, they have said they've said they've backed the truce, but it doesn't include Lebanon. So if the Israeli operations continue there, is this really a regional ceasefire?

SPEAKER_00 14:14

So whether or not it includes Lebanon is a real open question because the very first reports I saw about this this morning quite early, it did include Lebanon, you know, and then in subsequent reports, Israel made it clear that it did not. They feel that they have Hezbollah within their reaches, within their clutches, and they don't want to have to come back to this again, which is a little bit surprising in the sense that, you know, the exact same thing can be said for Iran, which is that they don't have Iran in their clutches. I don't want to give that impression, but they don't want to have to come back to this problem again, and this problem is the furthest thing from being solved, you know, compared to when it ever was since the Iranian Revolution. So I struggle to think about how this is going to be a ceasefire that Israel is going to want to continue post this two-week mark. But I do think that they want to that they want to make sure that they can deal with the Lebanese issue, you know, in final. That said, they thought they did that, of course, I think it was 18 months ago with their attacks on Hezbollah. There was an interesting phrase somebody used recently, which is that, you know, once you've cut off the head, then you can start cutting off the arms. And again, this is in reference to Israel's decapitation strategy. They've killed and continue to have killed an awful lot of very senior members of the Iranian IRGC, who's running the country. It's kind of a military dictatorship in that sense. And the arms constitute these other entities that belong in many ways to Iran, whether it's Hamas or whether it's Hezbollah or the Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. And they believe that the arms, being Hezbollah and Hamas in particular, are so weakened at the moment that now is the now is the time to get rid of them.

SPEAKER_01 16:02

So it's only been the last couple of hours, I think, that the Israeli military have announced further escalation. And so that's going against, as you say, what you said this morning, what was initially reported this morning. And then there's been in the last sort of 20 minutes, I think Sky have started to report that the Israeli military have been saying, you know, it's it's time to evacuate to Lebanon. And so is this is this likely to be a breaking point in the ceasefire? Is this something that could send the whole thing crumbling down, or is Lebanon considered a separate issue to involve parties?

SPEAKER_00 16:35

I think that Iran is not going to put itself out for Lebanon, for the poor Hezbollah. Um, and Hezbollah was willing to put itself out for Iran. It can tell you a lot about the strings there and who's pulling them. I think Hamas is a really interesting case too. Hamas has to agree to, I think, the second stage of the peace plan within the next few weeks or within the next week, perhaps. And, you know, a week ago, or even a month ago, Hamas might have been reluctant to do so, thinking that it could get something from Iran or they could get more support in order to hold out against Israel. I don't think they think that anymore, because Iran is going to be very laser focused on making sure that it's it's true, as I mentioned, center of gravity, the strait is what it's what it's protecting, rather than Hamas and Hezbollah. But there's been a few relationships that have gone through a real transition point as a result of this conflict. Not just, for example, um Hamas's relationship with Iran, but also with Qatar, which of course was another not supporter, not patron, but ally in the region. Um when Qatar was attacked by Iran, Hamas didn't did not come out against those attacks. And so Qatar uh, you know, for good reason wants to cut ties with Hamas as a result of that. The Saudi-Pakistani relationship looks strong, but at the same time, there was an interesting article recently that said that the security pact that Saudi had r had agreed to with Pakistan was a was a joint security pact indicating that if one was attacked, the other was also attacked. But Pakistan, very I mean, I don't know if this was true, but the the article made a point of saying that at the onset of this conflict on February 28th, you might remember Pakistan attacked uh Afghanistan, claiming that Afghanistan had been violating their own border security. And in in in the first week of that conflict, 400 people were killed in Kabul by the Pakistanis in a, I think it was a missile attack. And they were able to use that as a reason that they could not come to Saudi's, let's say, side by pressuring Iran on its southern side because they had this conflict in Afghanistan that appeared, according to this article, somewhat manufactured. So it's interesting about, you know, everybody's kind of looking at each other, kind of figuring out whether or not they could have done more, did they do enough, or have they gone to the wrong side, and what side are they looking at now? And then of course you have the potential détente between UAE and Saudi, which I think will be welcome.

SPEAKER_01 19:26

Have you ever seen that meme where it's a group of spidermen and they're all pointing at each other? I'll show it to you. It's it just feels a little bit like that at the moment because it's like who's responsible for what? Where does everybody stand? And as you say, like how much are they willing to put themselves out? And I think one of the main questions coming through the headlines this morning, and anyone that's been sort of uh critical of how this has all played out, is questioning whether there's uh whether it's a breakthrough, as lots of PRs are saying it is, or whether it's a diplomatic disaster.

SPEAKER_00 20:00

I don't know how even the best spin doctors in the world will not be able to spin this well for the states. And it's because reality is like, you know, it's kind of a slap in the face, which is that the US looks like they've capitulated to a strengthened Iran over the Strait of Hormuz primarily, but that it reflects the fact that they hadn't thought through, you know, the the consequences of some of these attacks and the and the points of vulnerability in Iran and then the points of strength in Iran, what they would be able to do. And somebody was m saying recently that you know that that it was not apparent that they would have taken the strait, for example, and then others were saying, well, you know, I'm just sitting here at home, and even I knew that they would take the strait. Like it's this is this wasn't I mean, Stevie Wonder could have seen that coming, let alone, you know, an entire, you know, security infrastructure and organization in the states. But I mean, besides all that, I think it looks bad for the US, which is why I think that it can't be left here, which is why I think I don't quite trust it. The US as the most formidable fighting force you know the world has ever seen, can't possibly capitulate over control of some very key choke points, right? Of course, uh like the strait, that it could take. It could take it.

SPEAKER_01 21:25

But they have been saying the strait is the rest of the world's problem. We don't we don't get anything that we need through the strait. So, you know, if you if you want the strait reopened, you come and do it yourself. And then you say about spin doctors, then what what on earth could we call Trump describing this as a complete and total victory?

SPEAKER_00 21:45

I know. I I mean I think it's better for everybody's kind of sanity if we don't take the words too seriously coming from that. But one you know, I the US is not going to come out well out of this. Even when they change The terms, which they will, in order to be able to make something out of this that isn't a total disaster, I don't think it's going to come out particularly well from it. It's, you know, as I mentioned, one of its most lasting legacies is it's really shifted the relationship between the Gulf and the states in ways that are not going to be beneficial to the states in the long term. And in the short term, I think that certainly Russia did well out of this. China has done pretty well out of it. People who kind of kept out of it at the moment have done pretty well out of it. But one person who I would be incredibly shocked if he saw the summer in his current role is Pete Hexah. They're gonna have to, some heads are gonna have to roll in the States for this. And I would imagine that his will be the first.

SPEAKER_01 22:46

Yeah, no, it's I mean, it sounds about right because I I don't know, as you say, I don't they can't be taking the words literally, but how how can they put this forward and get the response that they want? It's yeah, I think as far as I'm concerned, that's the bit that I'll be waiting to hear and see. Because I suppose the other side of this is okay, whilst all of the detail is very unclear, no one really knows what it means right now, the value in the ceasefire is what may have happened otherwise. As in, what have we just avoided, do you think, by the ceasefire being called right now? Given we know the the strikes are increasing, we know the tensions were continuing to rise.

SPEAKER_00 23:25

There were three options about what was going to happen, right? Um in as of today, let's say, right? The first is that they were going to start attacking massive attacks on civilian infrastructure. Israel had sent a message to Iranian civilians that they should effectively keep out of public areas and that yesterday, indicating that that was certainly going to be hit. The second, of course, was that they were going to somehow take over whether it's Abu Musa or the Tuns or some sort of placement of US troops within the strait in order to facilitate better movement. And the third was that they were potentially going to try to use the nuclear control and of course, like get to nuclear uh deposits as a way of of declaring this massive threat having been dissipated, you know, in this stage of the conflict. So none of those happened, although, as I mentioned yesterday, Carg Island was, I think, hit about 80 times. And the chief of intelligence was killed. Uh, last week the chief of the Navy was killed in Iran. There there was an attempt, a kind of not half-hearted, I don't want to give that impression, there wasn't a clear line about what was likely going to happen and whether or not it was going to be enough to placate people who think that the US has gone into this without an agenda that can be achieved militarily, because it has no strategy about what it actually wanted. And so it's kind of playing around with the variables, the potential outcomes, until it finds one that's going to placate, you know, the people who complained about how they've just upended the global economy and and global stability kind of on a whim, but they're not going to be able to do that.

SPEAKER_01 25:20

No. So okay, let's end on this then because I've seen the Frank Gardner, the BBC security correspondent, he said, um, is this just kicking the problem down the road? Yes. The main question now is what's coming in the next couple of days, and what is the problem that's being kicked down the road? It's it's so unclear what's going to happen next.

SPEAKER_00 25:41

It's so it's it is so unclear, right? I mean, I've read different accounts about how Trump must have known about the ceasefire, which is why he was using such escalatory language. You know, he was safe in that use because he knew it was never going to happen. Others who believe, truly believe, as I did, that he had every bloody intention of um really, really pushing force as the way of um disabling the Iranian regime in order to make them give up certain controls, especially of the strait, but also to wound it enough so that the so that the Gulf wouldn't have to be consistently worried that this was a problem in two weeks, but not not continuously. But I don't know, but it's not over. It really isn't over.

SPEAKER_01 26:30

No. I can't help but worry. The the conversations about the strait from Trump has certainly in the last few weeks have been it's not our problem. We don't need it, it's it's kind of irrelevant to us. So how come the sort of lessening up on the restrictions in in that area is that heavy enough to for for Trump to concede on anything else? It doesn't feel like it's Yeah, that's a good point.

SPEAKER_00 26:55

He's like trying to he's trying to grab a victory from something he already said was unimportant to him. I mean, uh this is what I meant earlier about, I guess, market manipulation. They may not care about the strait, but they care about what the strait is effectively controlling, which is the energy price and the stock market price. They maybe they feel like they need to get back a little bit of public support in the states, which has never been tagged to how well they're doing in the conflict. It's always been tagged to the energy price. They want to rebuild that a bit before they go in for the next version, the next level. Out of all of this, I would be the most concerned for Israel and what what it means for Israel's security to not have um to not have any assurances that Iran's now you know radicalized, emboldened regime doesn't have it even more so in its sights into the future, and the other Gulf states who who seem to be left with this seething, violent, and now quite lucrative or rather financially well-off state. You know, it's it's bad. And we definitely have more questions than answers at this point, right? Yeah, we definitely do. But so does everybody. So um we're in good company.

SPEAKER_01 28:16

True. You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest with Professor Cleaner Raleigh, brought to you by ACLED, the world's leading source of political violence and protest data. Subscribe so you never miss an episode, and follow us on socials for updates in the meantime.