IRAN WAR: No deal, no passage: Inside the blockade reshaping the Middle East

Six weeks into the Iran conflict, the tides are shifting rapidly—and the stakes could not be higher. 

As the U.S. and Israel escalate their military posture, threatening to impose a naval blockade on Iran, a new chapter in regional power plays is unfolding—one that could redefine control over the Strait of Hormuz and the entire Persian Gulf. 

In this episode of Conflict of Interest, ACLED CEO Professor Clionadh Raleigh and ACLED expert Bassel Doueik delve into the decisions fueling Iran’s vulnerability, the implications of the U.S. blockade, and Israel's asymmetric warfare tactics. Drawing on ACLED data and regional expertise, they break down the complex web of regional actors, from Hezbollah’s role in Lebanon to the Saudi and Gulf states' subtle balancing act, and the economic chokehold designed to weaken Iran from within.

The question isn't just what happens next, but how these strategic moves could tip the balance of power and reshape alliances for years to come. 

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

Why diplomacy was doomed to fail

SPEAKER_02 0:00

This initial round was destined for failure.

SPEAKER_00 0:03

The US and Israel did not come to save the Iranian people. That's clearly the difference that's happening here. This is why we call Israel the wild card because it doesn't want a ceasefire. And the Iranians said that we want Lebanon to be included within the ceasefighter. Either Lebanon is in or we're gonna ignite the whole conflict all over again.

SPEAKER_01 0:21

Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

Six weeks into the Iran war and failed peace talks

SPEAKER_02 0:28

Hello everybody, welcome back to Conflict of Interests after what has been a very, very tumultuous weekend. To set the scene, we are now six weeks into the 2026 Iran War. The conflict began on February 28th with the US and Israel launching joint strikes on Iran under the codename Epic Fury. Although it's it's it's Roaring Lion, I think, in in Israel. Is that not right, Basel?

SPEAKER_00 0:58

Correct. I can't believe we've come that long since the start of the conflict.

SPEAKER_02 1:02

Yeah, yeah, over 40 days. Okay, and let's recall, of course, what it looked like at the very beginning. We had the killing of Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khameni, and it triggered a wave of retaliatory missile and drone attacks across the region. A two-week ceasefire was announced on April 7th, and that went to an effect on April 8th, which was brokered by Pakistan, and then came a big diplomatic event of this weekend. On Saturday, Vice President J.D. Vance arrived in Islamabad alongside Special Envoy Steve Whitcoff and Jared Kushner to discuss peace talks with Iranian officials, including the Foreign Minister Abbas Ranchi and parliamentary speaker Mohammed Fadir Halid Kaliba. Russell is obviously much much better than I had saying. So um but after more than twenty-one hours of talks across multiple rounds, it's announced that there was no deal. But what did come of it, I think, was a much better understanding of what Iran's vulnerabilities were. So we're gonna start with a discussion about that. Of course, what we see this morning on April 13th is that Trump has responded by threatening a full naval blockade of Iran. And it's starting to feel very 1700, which which I'm not a military historian, but I'm enjoying. I'm enjoying the the reusing of terms that we haven't heard of in quite a while. What do you think, Basil?

SPEAKER_00 2:30

Exactly. Like what what we've seen with Trump is that he he jumps between these military terms and military expressions that actually military experts shy away from saying them because they know an endeavor like that would take maybe weeks or months to implement, and they don't know if it will actually work to blockade all the ships going out of Hormuz. But it's quite interesting to see how these marathon talks happened. Like it was everything was quite fast. Everything happened in 21 hours, I think. And then JD Advance came out, the vice president, and said that there was no deal that had been done. But I think I think there is there is no alternative than a deal being struck between the Iranians and the Americans. I think the current talks are just phase one of the talk. I don't expect um a conflict that has extended for more than 40 years to be done in one piece talk. So I I think I think that's that's important to note. Like these things may take more time.

US naval blockade and the battle for the Strait of Hormuz

SPEAKER_02 3:31

100%. But I do think, and I'll be curious about your thoughts on this, I do think that this round, this initial round, was destined for failure. Uh, not necessarily because I think the people in the room wanted them to fail, but because all of the additional components, all of the other actors in this were not happy with this position being the one that was going to be negotiated from. And so I think that this naval blockade, I'm curious about what other archaic military terms we're going to start hearing, but I do think that this blockade itself is very important in order to affect some of Iran's vulnerabilities. So before we get on to that, I just wanted to note that the ceasefire remains in place technically, as you noted battle, but is badly strained. And the Strait of Hormuz, of course, remains contested. And we're recording this today in midday UK time. Oil is currently 102 per barrel, and in about three hours the blockade comes into place. So CENCOM, which is um the US Central Command, has noted that it's not blocking the whole strait. It's blocking Iranian ports, and of course, uh exports coming from Iranian ports. And they specifically mention this, which is they will be implementing a blockade of all maritime traffic entering and exiting Iranian ports on the 13th of April at 10 a.m. Eastern, in accordance with President Trump's proclamation. The blockade will be enforced impartially against vessels of all nations entering or departing Iranian ports and coastal areas, including all Iranian ports on the Arabian Gulf and the Gulf of Oman. DENCOM forces will not impede freedom of navigation for vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz in or from non-Iranian ports, and of course additional information will be provided. Basil, I want to I want us to reflect a little bit on why this blockade and why now and what they think this is going to shift. Please.

Oil, China, and the economic war on Iran

SPEAKER_00 5:58

With a couple of other actors, some people say the Gulf, some analysts say that even Saudi Arabia didn't want such a deal. They want the Americans to go all in. But I think the naval blockade comes from the idea that there is an escalation ladder here. So if if we go back to the start of the conflict, we see that mainly the targets that were hit by the airstrikes, the US and Israeli joint airstrikes, were military installations and the security military architecture of the IRGC. And then we went to another escalation, and that was the targeting of energy infrastructure in the region and energy infrastructure in Iran. And then we've seen that they were targeting actually internal security forces in Iran, in Tehran, that had checkpoints on the roads for people. So I think we we're continuing with this escalation ladder, and now we've reached the naval blockade after Trump threatened to wipe out power plants in Iran. I I don't think he will go that route or uh that much during with this escalation ladder. But I would say this naval blockade is mainly aimed at also pressuring China in some way, because most of the ships that are, or I think all of the ships that are coming out of the Strait of Hormos since 40 days were only Iranian ships bound to countries that Iran have agreements with or deliver oil with at discounted prices outside of the world oil architecture, let's say. And 90% of that was going to China. So I think that brings China into into the picture here, like this may affect it directly.

SPEAKER_02 7:33

I think that's an excellent point. There's obviously there's something going on here around commodities more broadly and who gets to have access to them and at at what cost. I'm I want to come back to something you said before though, which is that what might the conflict look like after this particular juncture? So you have a blockade, which I agree with you, I think it it's it's very much the next step in this conflict because the center of gravity still remains the Strait of Hormuz. And of course, one of the challenges last week before the ceasefire was in place was this sense, to be totally frank, that Iran had kind of bested the US and Israel, and that it had won this round by surviving, you know, and being at the same table with with the US around negotiations. But part of the concern was too that that the campaign to date had not weakened Iran, but it had in in fact kind of strengthened certain aspects of its continuation, including, of course, its ability to extract significant financial gains from the strait. And I think it's important to remember that the strait itself had been international waters, and in fact, the highway, if you will, in and out of the Gulf had been really in Omani waters before this conflict. Whereas the proposed changes to the strait that Iran had put forth last week placed the new highways, both in and out, very, very firmly within Iranian waters. And so this leverage that Tehran believes that it it had won through this air campaign is going to be destroyed effectively by the blockade. So any thoughts on that about what it's intending to do with Iran's financial position if it cannot use this for its own financial gain, or in fact, as you say, change the calculus with other countries that have become close to Iran?

SPEAKER_00 9:32

I think I I love the point about the Strait of Hormuz being the center of gravity, because that's what actually Iran won during this conflict. I think since the start of the conflict, Iran has had total control over the state of Hormuz, despite American claims that ships can come in and out of the strait. We've not seen any, I think, maritime traffic from there except from Iranian ships bound to China and other places in the world. And I think uh what Trump is trying to do, and as you as you clearly mentioned, is that he's trying to strip that center of gravity from Iran and put it under American or world control in order to manage those things. But I I think to go further into that, the fiscal and the monetary part of this whole issue and the macroeconomy of this is that they're trying to put additional financial and monetary stress on the Iranian regime because that's how Iran basically makes money. It has a lot of resources, it sells this oil mainly and gas to China, and it makes money from it to fund its campaigns everywhere in the Middle East. So since the start of the American financial sanctions on Iran, I think with Trump's second term, he added additional sanctions that actually stressed the Iranian economy. And that's why actually we've seen that protests came out during, I think around three or four months ago, from the merchants' market in Tehran because they felt the brunt of the sanctions. And that's why the currency has crippled. And now we've seen that the currency is just falling and falling down. So I think the the macroeconomic picture of this is that to add f more financial stress on the Iranian regime and not to only after them militarily and security-wise, but mostly I would say also financially, in order to encircle the regime and try to actually oust it. But would this actually oust the regime? Would we reach that result? I think for the time being, this this should be analyzed further.

What the US wants and why Iran won’t agree

SPEAKER_02 11:41

If we think about what was being requested in the peace talks themselves, right, it was the removal and dismantling of all nuclear capabilities. Of course, it was in particular in the three facilities that that are known and still operational, and handing over a stockpile of the enriched uranium. There was also, of course, the Strait of Hormuz being reopened as a free maritime corridor. That's probably the easiest one to deal with just at this exact moment. And then, of course, it was the retraction of any support to these regional militias, which we will also discuss in a moment. And in many ways, the Strait of Hormuz is the only aspect of that that the Trump administration can try to affect, even if it is quite costly to do so. I'm I'm struck with the idea though that we were here maybe five weeks ago, maybe maybe four weeks ago, when obviously the control of the strait had been wrestled into Iranian hands. And Trump just said, well, you know, if if the world is so concerned about getting their hands on their energy supply, whether it's natural gas or or oil, or you know, they can they can open the strait themselves and now effectively needs to put in a intensive blockade to it. It's not going in the right direction, even if we are narrowing down some of these objectives.

SPEAKER_00 13:07

Yeah, I I would say so as well, because he he also asked NATO to help unblock the Strait of Hormuz, and no, let's say, European ally or even Australia or New Zealand or any other country that actually have relations with the US wanted the Strait of Formuz or wanted to be a part of this international force to open the Strait of Hormuz. But I I I think the the bigger picture is as well that Trump didn't consult anyone. He went to this war with a deal with uh Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to degrade Iran. And I think yesterday I was watching a documentary by the New York Times, and it was, I think by the New York Times, and it was talking about how Trump took this decision for war. And what struck me is that the Secretary of State Marco Ruby said, if we're doing this for a regime change, we shouldn't start a war. And that's that makes total sense of what's happening right now.

Sanctions, civilians, and pressure on the Iranian regime

SPEAKER_02 14:03

I agree with you there, and in fact, like Vance, Vance is believed to be the leak for that documentary or the you know the discussions within the Oval Office and in fact the situation room with Benjamin Netanyahu pre-war. And the reason is is because he comes out looking like the one who was, you know, most sage in his wisdom about what was going to happen. But anyway, that's neither here nor there. I will say that it's interesting to think about the fact that this still seems to be reoccurring, which is that the blockade is meant to financially strangle Iran and in doing so create a lot of pressure at home. So both the pressure from the air campaign to date, the decapitation that's continued, right? And in fact, there was some worries about that, and Israel resuming that campaign because of the size of the Iranian entourage that went to Islamabad now being open targets. But we'll set that aside for the moment. I'm I'm interested, I suppose, in how this develops, which is that this blockade, you know, in strangling Iran's finances is expected to put quite a lot of pressure on food imports, of course, on their currency system, on anything that they import, but also, of course, on their ability to fund this conflict. And while the New York Times story about the run-up to this conflict made a big focus that Netanyahu had promised some sort of internal dissension that was going to come from this, that of course didn't appear because it's it's quite impossible for people to challenge the IRGC in its current iteration. I'm wondering if you think that in combination with what's already happened with the airstrikes, the decapitation, will a complete inability to keep normal life running within Iran be the straw that broke this camel's back?

SPEAKER_00 15:55

Well, I I think the main concern here is the humanitarian aspect, is that if people cannot access food, if they cannot access water, if they cannot have fertilizer to grow their agricultural farms and lands, that's a big issue for the Iranian people and as well for the IRGC. But can we expect the Iranian people to come out and protest against the IRGC while the regime is consolidating itself? Like we've seen since the start of the airstrikes that the regime has consolidated its uh power. A lot of people came out rallying behind the regime. Some opposition also protesters came out and said this they're bombing our homeland, especially after airstrikes hit the schools, they hit energy infrastructure as well, and after Israel uh in particular uh targeted the oil infrastructure in Iraq and Tehran, and there was black smoke everywhere. So they they are realizing that the US and Israel have different interests than the Iranian people at this point.

SPEAKER_02 16:54

That's a great point.

SPEAKER_00 16:56

The US and Israel did not come to save the Iranian people, but rather they came to meet some objectives that they want to happen to Iran at the same moment. And that's that that's clearly the the difference that's happening here. Going back to the main question, will this naval blockade actually strain the IRGC? I think if uh the US can uh uh prevent Iran from exporting its food, exporting its oil, exporting its its gas or energy, I think that's a big step uh into this conflict. I think with additional financial strain, this would actually take things further and it may actually escalate the conflict, prompting the IRGC maybe to retarget Gulf states and launch and actually it being the start of another war in the conflict.

Blockade risks and the threat of regional escalation

SPEAKER_02 17:48

I like this line of thought because I do think that the expectation that financial difficulties will somehow hasten internal internal dissension is typically focused on Iranian citizens, but it could just as easily be focused on inside the IRGC themselves, which are a notoriously competitive, often quite corrupt, very embedded within the Iranian economy as a way to use their power to supplement their financial gains from their powerful position within Iranian society. And so that being the engine really keeping this regime going, not any sort of you know, resort to religious authority or anything like that, but rather how embedded the IRGC is within the economy of Iran.

SPEAKER_00 18:37

Before the war started, I think the Americans and the Israelis aligned thought that there will be much more desertation from the IRG personnel, from people in high positions within the IRGC after this war starts. But that's clearly not the case. So with this blockade of the Strait of Formuz, I think the additional financial strain on these people working for the IRGC that cannot get their food or cannot get their supplies or cannot get their money will actually maybe cause desertation between their forces.

SPEAKER_02 19:10

Yep, I I I couldn't agree more. But another perspective is that there will be pressure on the IRGC, and in particular from hardliners within Iran, to escalate this conflict so that the costs become extremely high in an extremely short period of time and thereby create a new a new playing field for negotiations. So obviously they can't return immediately because nothing has changed since their last breakdown. So some some things will happen within the next, you know, let's say two weeks, because it's such a favorite amount of time amongst the American administration, right? Some some really great analysts on Iran have claimed that this will effectively, as you mentioned, increase the likelihood that there's continued attacks in the Gulf. And I really want to stress here that despite a ceasefire, Iran has been lobbying weapons into Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar over this weekend. So it certainly didn't treat its neighbors as part of the ceasefire during this time. And I want to emphasize that there's some talk about really raising the stakes on Israel, which you mentioned earlier, and specifically on civilian Israeli targets.

SPEAKER_00 20:26

Exactly, I agree. And we we've seen that Iran did not respect the ceasefire. People within Iran say that the IRGC, some forces of the IRGC do do not know that there is a ceasefire, even, and they're launching rockets because of the flexible and fluid command and control structure they have to avoid the decapitation strikes. But I think one of the reasons actually Trump did not wipe out the power plants in Iran is because of the perceived retaliation that will happen against the Gulf states that will put immense pressure on the Trump administration. And I think the Gulf states in general, being Qatar or the UAE or Saudi Arabia, I think the UAE we can put it aside, but Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Kuwait, I think they lobbied not to initiate such strikes because it will affect their own countries as well. Because uh the IRGC said that we will target each and every energy infrastructure in these states if our energy infrastructure is targeted, including Israel. And we've seen that the Iranians are capable of targeting the power plants in Israel. We've seen that they attacked the Haifa refinery and it actually struck inside and within the refinery. And we've seen that Iran has launched less missiles and drones against Israel, but more effective and with heavier payload, and they've actually hit civilian sats, as you mentioned.

Israel, Hezbollah, and the expanding Lebanon front

SPEAKER_02 21:46

Yeah, uh so this is a good way to see this conflict from the perspective of Israel at the moment and what its terrain looks like in terms of both Lebanon and Iran. Would you like to give us an update on? What's happening within that conflict specifically and how Hezbollah is reacting?

SPEAKER_00 22:04

I would say that Israel has been far as successful in decoupling the conflict in Lebanon from the conflict in Iran. I think Hezbolla started this war or restarted the hostilities with Israel in order to couple both the conflicts so that if a regional ceasefire would occur, it would be included in that ceasefire. Because as we know, after the November 2024 ceasefire, Israel continued attacking Hezbollah members across Lebanon without any retaliation. I would say since the ceasefire, the war between Israel and Hezbollah is intensifying, especially as the Israeli military shifts its focus to the Lebanon front. So I think when the war was going on with Iran, 80% of Israeli military capability was focused on Iran, while 20% was focused on Lebanon. And during recent uh recent statements by the uh IDF chief of staff, he said that our main focus and our main front is Lebanon, or is the front against Hezbollah in Lebanon. So I just want to talk about a bit about the April 8th strikes. So on April 8th, now it's labeled in Lebanon as Black Wednesday. In this date, the Israeli Air Force carried out an extensive bombardment campaign. It included 50 fighter jets carrying out 108 airstrikes across the country in 10 minutes and dropping around 160 bombs. What's significant about this is that they said we attacked Hezbollah sites, its elite Radwan force unit, and the its air unit as well, which is the 127th unit. However, we've seen that these airstrikes actually targeted a lot of civilian areas within Beirut and outside of Hezbollah's strongholds. And I think until April 13th, at least 380 people have been killed, and more one more than 1,000 people have been injured in only 10 minutes of bombardment. And this is like very uh significant. Also, after the April 8th strikes, and just before we move on to that, on April 8th, uh the ceasefire took place between or after, let's say, 15 or 16 hours from the ceasefire between Iran and uh the US. Israel launched that airstrikes, those airstrikes, as a response also to the ceasefire. And this is why we call Israel the wild card the wild card, because it doesn't want a ceasefire, and that was some type of strategy to offset the ceasefire, because the Iranians said that we want Lebanon to be included within the ceasefire. Either Lebanon is in or we're gonna ignite the whole conflict all over again.

SPEAKER_02 24:46

Yeah, that was actually one of the reasons that potentially it was going to break down just in its early hours was whether or not Lebanon was included. And so it's an interesting perspective, I think, from Israel's side that Hezbollah is not it's not the same war. Their war with Iran versus their war between the two of them. And um also, of course, that that Israel and the Palestinian conflict is also not in considered within this at all, and they they wanted to move it into that kind of domestic problem category. It's I suppose I am struck by the fact that we've said here before that Israel doesn't want this ceasefire to go forward, and there's a there's a contrasting amount of information about whether or not Hezbolla wanted it to go forward. I would imagine that at the moment where it looks like Iran was doing relatively well, it certainly did. But just as just to step back for a moment, I'm gonna ask you, can Hezbolla survive without Iran?

Can Hezbollah survive without Iran?

SPEAKER_00 25:47

I would say it cannot, honestly. Without the financial, without the Iran's financial help, without Iran's military help, Hezbollah cannot survive. And that's why we've seen since the fall of the Assad regime, Hezbollah in itself did not receive any new weapons from Iran. They just collected what they had in Syria and brought it back to Lebanon and produced what can be produced locally. But Iran still pays Hezbollah, and I think during the last year it paid it around$50 million, according to the American treasury.

SPEAKER_02 26:18

And if it is if it is unable to survive now without patrons in Syria or Iran, which is increasingly potentially likely, then what is Israel fighting? I know that sounds like an odd question, but rather like what is the size and shape of Hezbollah if Iran is not its supporter?

SPEAKER_00 26:41

So I I I think that's a very, very good question because we've we're we're going back to 1982 and 1985 where actually Israel invaded Lebanon in order to expel the Palestinians, and then Hezbollah was created with support by the IRGC. But we remember at that time it was only guerrilla warfare. It was hit-and-run tactics by Hezbollah. Uh people were uh like fighters from the group, they were uh attacking Israeli soldiers along the blue line, they were attacking the South Lebanon army. It was more of uh guerrilla warfare, they didn't have that capability, they didn't have those weapons. I think Israel is still fighting the same force, but in a different shape. In 2024, Hezbollah launched its um uh Gaza support front from Lebanon against Israel, and it treated it like an army. When Israel fought Hezbollah as an army, Hezbollah got decapitated, got dismantled, and it got uh it acted very hard. And part of the reconstruction tactic was to change its modus operandi from being an army to coming back to guerrilla warfare. And this is what's happening now in southern Lebanon.

Israel’s strategy and the risk of miscalculation

SPEAKER_02 27:57

So just to kind of summarize what I'm seeing either on the US front or even here within the UK, so there has been a marked decrease in support for Israel, not just from the Gaza conflict, but also I think because of that story that you referenced earlier, where it was seeming like Netanyahu in particular has kind of tricked or let's say led Trump into war that was going to have a better outcome. From the Israeli side, they will say we're dealing with existential threats, one directly in Iran, but another one that is being funded from Iran to continue to threaten and harass, of course, the Israelis ability to occupy that land, and that there has been some progress on the part of Gaza as a result of, bizarrely enough, supported peace, right? And so, I mean, how would you if you were going to scope out, I think, whether or not Netanyahu can make a reasonable claim to continuity in the upcoming elections based on these conflicts, do you think that it's one that effectively is we're trying to deal with these threats once and for all so that Lebanon can continue as as a normal country without being hijacked by this entity, and that Iran can no longer threaten us or its other neighbors? I don't need to do any Netanyahu campaigning for him.

Why Hezbollah persists despite state pressure in Lebanon

SPEAKER_00 29:23

I'm just wondering like if I think that's the calculus that what's happening now. He's trying to feed to the Israeli public that we have an exist existential threat called Hamas, we have an exist existential threat called Hezbollah, and another one in Iran. And he believes, and as he continuously say, that if we dismantle the IRGC, if we crush the IRGC, if the regime in Iran falls, then the domino effect will take uh will take will across the axis of resistance uh with Hezbollah, with Hamas, with the Houthis, etc. But I think also the calculus here is wrong. Hezbollah is not an existential threat to Israel because Hezbollah simply does not have the capability to existentially threat Israel. However, it can antagonize it uh by uh by launching rockets until uh targeting snow thrown communities, targeting Israeli soldiers in the in the south. But I want to stress here is that Israel did not respect the November 2024 ceasefire. They said that they will withdraw from Lebanon. They did not withdraw from the five strategic hills. They said that they will actually give a chance for the Lebanese government to dismantle Hezbollah and south of the Litani River. But the Lebanese army came out recurrently and said that the only obstacle for us to disarming Hezbollah is Israel, is the presence of Israeli soldiers and Israeli vehicles and equipment and etc. military points along the border. So if if Israel really wants Hezbollah to be dismantled, I think all the support should go to the Lebanese government, it should go to the newly elected Lebanese president, newly elected Lebanese prime minister, and to the Lebanese army. One of the main obstacles that the Lebanese army could not assert its full control south of the Litani River, it's because of financial strain. They cannot simply afford to do that. And that's where a financial gap plus a power gap in south of the Litani made Hezbollah come back and sustain its operational presence in the area. So I think if there is genuine interest in the disarmament of Hezbollah, the only way that should be done is diplomatically and politically and through support to the Lebanese army and to the current Lebanese government. Because the Lebanese government in itself is going after Hezbollah. The Prime Minister recently said that we're declaring Beirut as a safe city, like without any weapons, there should be no military presence, there should be no Hezbollah militants, and nevertheless, the southern suburbs of Beirut. He's trying to save what's left of the country. And even the Lebanese government believes that Hezbollah dragged the country into another war. So basically, the Israelis are getting in law what they cannot get on ground. And this is what they're not understanding, or they do not want to understand. And I'm not talking about the entire Israeli uh like politics, I'm only talking about the current Israeli government, which is very far right, and it believes that the Litani River is the new border of Israel, as Smotric recently said.

SPEAKER_02 32:42

Yeah, that guy. I find it really interesting there, which is that then their actions, especially in Beirut, would have countered some of this, let's say, positive alignment that they would have had with the Lebanese government. But equally, as as often as Israel kind of overstretches its mandate, especially with Lebanon, I'm struck by the fact that that Iran, too, should it change this conflict towards Iranian citizens, could equally overstep the position that it um is seeming to occupy at the moment and and engender quite a lot of if not sympathy, then certainly empathy for the challenge Israel has in front of it by having to deal with several threats simultaneously. So they could both be working against their own purposes by following an escalation path.

What happens next after failed talks and a fragile ceasefire

SPEAKER_00 33:33

Exactly. Totally agree with that. And the part is that the Israeli government should give a chance for the Lebanese government to assert its control. And we know that tomorrow we're having peace talks between the Lebanese ambassador to Washington and the Israeli ambassador, and this is the first time this happens since the uh Lebanese Civil War, direct negotiations together. But at the same time, as you said, this is this is backfiring against Israel. When you launch an aerial campaign that kills mostly civilians, this is a big issue. And even Ehut Olmert, which is the uh former prime minister in Israel, said that what he saw on that day was very disgusting from the Israeli military. And that's it's in his own words. So I believe there is some kind of shift in uh perception towards Lebanon from Israel. But as you said, as long as Israel continues those military campaigns, it will only strengthen the position of Hezbollah. Because many people believe if Hezbollah does not stop Israel, the Lebanese army cannot do it.

SPEAKER_02 34:36

That's really interesting, and especially, of course, with today's um with today's result around Orban and Hungary, there may be a shift occurring with some of the more far-right leaders, you know, populist leaders, of which Netanyahu would would be considered one. Although I think that it's interesting to reflect on the fact that some of these leaders are being challenged more from their corruption rather than their ideas. But with that, I think that we'll have uh another interesting two weeks in front of us as Iran, Israel, and the US decide how they manage to deal with this failed series of peace talks and potentially a failed ceasefire. Thank you very much, Basel.

SPEAKER_00 35:18

Thank you.

SPEAKER_01 35:19

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