Inside the world’s deadliest terror zone

JNIM. Islamic State Sahel Province. Boko Haram.

These are the groups driving a surge in violence across the Sahel—now the world’s deadliest region for terrorism.

Across Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, attacks are escalating at a pace that outstrips every other region globally. Coups, foreign troop withdrawals, and weakening state control have created space for militant groups to expand, adapt, and entrench themselves across vast areas of the region.

In this episode of Conflicts of Interest, ACLED CEO Professor Clionadh Raleigh is joined by Sahel expert Heni Nsaibia to unpack how the Sahel became the global epicentre of terrorism. Drawing on ACLED data and regional expertise, they break down the strategies of these groups, the role of military-led governments, and the local dynamics fuelling the spread of violence.

The question isn’t just why the Sahel has become so deadly—but how far this instability could spread, and what it means for global security.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_02 0:00

I think that ISSP are just real hardened bastards. The only people who can handle ISSP might be another jihadi group.

SPEAKER_00 0:09

JM engage in much higher levels of violence when compared to Islamic State, but Islamic State also utilizes violence in a way that to cite a friend of mine makes even JNM look like cuddly teddy bears.

SPEAKER_01 0:25

Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

SPEAKER_02 0:31

Hello everybody, welcome to another episode of Conflicts of Interest. My name is Kleina, and I will be the host today to our wonderful Sahelian analyst, Henny. Henny, welcome.

SPEAKER_00 0:42

Thank you.

SPEAKER_02 0:43

So we're going to focus today a little bit on what's been happening around the conflict in Iran. But um just to give an update, it's the 20th of April, and at the moment, in in Iran and in the Strait of Hornus, which is remains the center of gravity there, there is an ongoing blockade. I believe the US has seized or has uh boarded an Iranian tanker. The Iranians shut the strait yesterday or claimed to shut it yesterday. They had sent drones to different tankers on Saturday. They had open and shut it. The US had both engaged in the blockade and also claimed that they were sending representatives to Pakistan for another round of peace talks. At this moment, Iran has not said that they will actually join those talks in Pakistan or this next round. Of course, Pakistani representatives went to Tehran last week, I think, in order to salvage what was possible there. So I think that it's fair to say that we, the general public, and also the participants are just as much in a muddle about what is happening. So we are all equally clueless about what is going on in this conflict. Would you say so, Henny?

SPEAKER_00 1:55

Yeah, I would I would agree. And I mean it also adds to a list of conflicts that also have shifted away focus from Africa. So I think that is a particularly important implication when speaking about the continent. You know, after Gaza, the Iran war, and also previously we had Ukraine, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. So there is a succession of conflicts that really have shifted away focus from Africa. But I still think it's necessary to keep West Africa and the continent as a whole on the radar. Because even when we speak about Islamist militant groups like Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, they have really pivoted away from the Middle East to the African continent. And this is a gradual shift that has been ongoing since uh 2018. But even in most recent years, uh I think this process has uh accelerated.

SPEAKER_02 2:53

I agree that so much of the focus of the last 20 years in a lot of conflict studies, but a lot of conflict analysis has been on African conflicts. But conflicts are starting to emerge and sustain themselves in all sorts of parts of the world. We're kind of recognizing new conflicts, whether it is in Latin America or there's kind of resurgent, shape-shifting conflicts within the Middle East. But within the African continent, I think that there's a lot of expectations that it looks exactly the way it would have 20 years ago, when in fact those conflicts are going through their own sort of changes and innovations, particularly in West Africa, which has now been recognized as kind of the epicenter of terrorism with certainly Islamist violence in the world. And you, as an expert on this, are the perfect person to lead us through what exactly is happening in the Sahel, and a very brief synopsis of the last 14 years, because of course this kind of really kicked off in 2012.

SPEAKER_00 3:52

Yeah, so I mean to begin with, the the conflict in the Sahel is a protracted conflict. It's also the continuation of successive rebellions, especially in Mali, successive Tuareg rebellions. And the most recent was in 2012, was that really marked the outbreak of the Mali and the broader Sahel conflict. This initial Tuareg-led rebellion was hijacked by uh Yahist factions, including Al-Qaeda and Islamic Maghrib, uh local groups such as An Sardin, and also other factions like Al-Murabitun and the central contingent of An-Sardin Katiba Masina. However, in 2017, these groups merged into Jamat Nosratul Islam al-Muslimin. So there's been this kind of transformation over the years. And there was also a French military intervention that I think is important to put into context because the French military they intervened in Mali to really hamper the progression of militant groups. And that intervention occurred throughout almost uh a decade before the French withdrew, or they were literally expelled by the authorities in the region, including Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger.

SPEAKER_02 5:20

So this is really fascinating because you mentioned, of course, that there had been ongoing Toueg rebellions in the north of Mali. They had actually declared a republic at one point aswad. One of the things that's really interesting about this is that the group that became Jainin, which was an al-Qaeda affiliate, took advantage of this much smaller rebellion to really make it much bigger and more prolific and more diffuse than it had ever been before. And it was out of an opportunity rather than a really deeply held concern for the marginalization of the northern Malian Toreg community. And that type of opportunism we see repeated again and again within the Sahel, especially in the way that Islamic State moved in.

SPEAKER_00 6:06

So actually, Islamic State came into being before Jainim. So it was a faction or Adnan Abu Walid al-Sahrawi, a Western Saharan militant commander, part of Al-Murabi Tun, who broke broke away from this faction that was led by Mukhtar Bel Mukhtar, and by pledging allegiance to Islamic State, then became Islamic State in the Greater Sahara, or ISGS, that is basically the predecessor of what today is Islamic State Sahel province. So ISGS came into being in 2015, and it was initially a quite shady small group evolving in relative secrecy. They didn't have any propaganda apparatus or anything. It was very kind of rudimentary in terms of how the group claimed operations. They did it through international but also local outlets. However, with time and as this conflict has been ongoing, the group managed to recruit more people and also evolve in terms of military capabilities. And it gained notoriety in 2017 when it attacked US forces in the village of Tongo Tango. And after that, it has been a process of integrating the global infrastructure of the Islamic State. In that process, we have seen Islamic State in the Greater Sahara becoming something very different from what it was at the onset.

SPEAKER_02 7:38

I'm curious about why you would attribute the Sahel as being the host to two major groups and in many ways in competition with each other, sometimes in cooperation. What is it about this region that allowed both to thrive? Although I think we can assess that JNEM is doing far better in terms of some of its broader objectives, certainly about taking over territory than the now ISSP Sahel province. So let's start there. Why is it a host to both?

SPEAKER_00 8:08

Yeah, that's a very good question. And I mean, we have discussed poverty and socioeconomic drivers for many years, but I mean I think that's only a part of the puzzle as a whole. But still, I think it feeds into that these countries are considered among the poorest in terms of human development globally speaking. But it's also a question of the discrepancy or the disconnect between power bases and the periphery in many countries. And that is not specific only to the Sahel, but more broadly on the African continent. It's really in the border areas where we see that militant groups have been able to kind of exploit state weaknesses or a relative disinterest towards marginalized populations. And it's among especially pastoralist groups that both JN and what today is Islamic State Sahel has managed to gain a degree of support, but also found a recruitment base for their insurgent operations, basically.

SPEAKER_02 9:11

That's fascinating because the political geography of this conflict has merged. I mean, merged in the sense that JM and ISSP sometimes operate in largely the same areas. So I'm curious about one at the very bottom level, what do you think their different modes of recruitment are? Why would a person choose to join ISSP versus JNE? Or do they have such a choice? What's their language, I suppose, when they're operating within these areas, especially within Burkina Faso, about how they are different? And then how are the governments trying to react differently to both? Or do they consider both the same type of problem?

SPEAKER_00 9:50

No, they are they are different in in many ways. I mean, they share a common substratum or roots in uh the Algerian Civil War, Islamic State Sahel province historically had a leadership of Western Saharans, some of them with background within the Polisario movement that fights for independence for Western Sahara. However, in the Sahel they found an outlet to engage in violence, or I mean there is also a sort of Islamisation of various rebellions or part of segments within different rebellions, including the Western Sahara one, but also in Azawad. So however, they may claim this secessionist uh claim and calling for extensive autonomy or even independence. I think that also can apply be applied to some of those from coming from Western Sahara. But it but it's much more complicated than that. They have the same roots to come to the point. But there are also nuances. There are ideological differences, even though these groups have coexisted and even cooperated to some extent over the years. However, with the integration of Islamic State into Islamic State's global infrastructure, we have also seen that strategically the group has been pushed more into confrontation with their Al-Qaeda counterpart. And it also comes against the backdrop of the killings of some senior leaders within JNM that has enabled the conflict to somewhat, you know, explode or become triggered because you don't have the same people in position of authority to be able to appease tensions and so forth, but also like having direction from above, from Islamic State Central, and also like coordination with other affiliates like in Libya, but also in Nigeria, has all contributed to pushing these two groups into confrontation. And now this conflict has been ongoing for six years, so it's quite significant by itself, and have resulted in more than 300 battles, uh, more than 2,000 fighters killed uh combined in in both camps. So it is a deadly inter-Jihadi conflict that has been ongoing.

SPEAKER_02 12:15

Yeah, the inter-Jihadi nature is fascinating. We have to treat these conflicts not as an expression of local grievances, which I think an awful lot of African conflicts get attributed to it. And so they look to marginalization or poor development as reasons, but these are wars within their own right between armed groups that are struggling to effectively kind of strategically outdo each other politically and militarily. So what I mean by that is your earlier comment about how these groups have become Islamiszed. So groups that were were never within the realm of like an Islamic or a jihadi fight find themselves adopting that. They've rebranded in some ways in order to continue within this particular conflict theater is a real testament to the notion that conflicts must evolve in order to stay both relevant and possible within different environments. And within the Sahel, especially, but I would say, moreover, in several places within the African continent, Islamicization is the branding that was particularly successful in the last two decades. And that doesn't appear to be waning, but it does appear like the type of Islam that needs to be the basis of a successful movement is shifting. It's less religious and ideological and more about the organizational capabilities of an Islamist organization versus one that might have espoused a particular ethno-political or let's say even kind of socialist or or that type of ideology, economic ideology, as the basis for its existence. Does that make sense?

SPEAKER_00 13:55

Yeah, it it it does. But I still think ideology is plays a quite central role in how these groups frame their struggles. And that is also part of the conflict between them on questions on how to treat communities, implement uh, for instance, sharia, and and so forth. So that there are important aspects of ideol uh ideology when it pertains to their struggle.

SPEAKER_02 14:22

Can I ask, is that ideological difference meant to be a way for them to engage with each other, or is that how they express themselves to the population? And I ask because very specifically, there's kind of a the narcissism of small differences, which academics are famous for, right? But more broadly, would somebody who was well versed in conflict themselves recognize ideological differences as so starkly different between these two groups that they accounted for why there's two major types of jihadi operation operating in the Sahel?

SPEAKER_00 14:55

I would say yes. I mean, yeah, because Jainim, they have a much more gradual approach when it comes to the implementation of Sharia law. They are not as prolific at all when it comes to that form of implementation, especially the punishment of wrongdoers, in which Islamic State have a much more direct application of those kind of rules or or judgments. It's a different social order, but also in how they engage in violence. And Jainim is more broadly militarily active in six countries, they engage in much higher levels of violence when compared to Islamic State, but Islamic State also utilizes violence in a way that to cite a friend of mine makes even Jainim look like cuddly teddy bears. And it's not because they engage in more mass atrocities, they don't. Both groups employ collective punishment towards communities that they perceive as pro-state or pro-militia and so forth. But Islamic State it does it in a way that makes it more impactful. Even when comparing high impact attacks, JN, they momentarily took control of uh the Modipu Keita airport in Bamako in September 2024. Islamic State did a similar attack in Niame in January this year. However, the impact seemed disproportionate in relation to how successful or unsuccessful the the attack was.

SPEAKER_02 16:30

I think that ISGS and now ISSP are just real bastards, right? Like real hardened bastards. But Jenum are certainly not a better component, but ISSP are reactive to Jenum, and Janum has aspirations above just fighting with ISSP over ideological differences. I mean, they are currently holding Bamako in a siege, effectively, because of what their political aspirations are. Is ISSP just kind of an annoying side component to that? Or do they have distinct political aspirations within that area that they will really come to blows over?

SPEAKER_00 17:10

I think they have very different priorities. So JM has for a long time tried to play down the conflict with ISSP. I mean, it began uh with skirmishes in 2019, but it has an intensified since early 2020, and it has reached a sort of uh level somewhere in between. It's not an intense conflict, but it's ongoing and continuing. But it's still quite geographically limited. We have it in the northeast of Burkina Faso, where there is sort of transition zone between the groups, because their respective areas of operations are also quite delineated. So ISSP, they operate in the three-state border area, and they have also expanded into northwest Nigeria, while JNM is much more focused on Mali and Burkina Faso. And we also come to the priorities that JM primarily fights state forces and their allied militias. However, ISSP is quite keen on fighting JM, and they have also been quite successful in doing that. So if we look at JM as the more successful strategic actor, because that's how I view it, at the tactical level, when these two groups fight, ISSP has been more successful, uh, but still hasn't been able to return to areas where the group was pushed out by JNM from, or hasn't been able to take over substantial territory, except for the north of Menacca. In a way, it becomes an insurgency within the insurgency against a more kind of dominant actor.

SPEAKER_02 18:50

Just on that, that's really fascinating, I think, because as you're seeing that ISSP is now kind of the it's the smaller actor, it is setting the parameters for how this conflict evolves because its singular focus on preventing JM from being able to execute its own political agenda or military agenda on the region means that it constantly needs to be engaging with what ISSP wants. But also I think that as we were just saying, oh, overall evolution or branding has been particularly successful because I think that ISSP represents a far right of this particular ideological spectrum when it comes to Islamist groups and it's pulling people there. Do you know what I mean? Like the center is being pulled.

SPEAKER_00 19:36

Yeah, I mean the group's brutality has gained much more attention than that of JNI, even though, as I said, JNE is much more prolific in terms of not only the level of violence, but the toolbox that it employs as a violent actor is much more diverse and well developed when compared to ISSP. But ISSP still holds a role as a spoiler if we look at JNM's more broader political, military, religious project, so to speak.

SPEAKER_02 20:07

So when we talk about the insurgency within the insurgency, and you you of course mentioned that JNM is operational in six countries, its main combatants are are are engaging with the states or the state militaries, not necessarily ISSP. But they seem absent from this conflict, these respective six governments in some ways, despite the fact that they are actively engaged with JNE, in part because they don't seem to be shaping this conflict or its direction almost at all. These two groups seem to be doing so, and potentially more so with ISSP than JNE. Can you speak a little bit to those in charge of especially Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso, and what position they find themselves in in dealing with these Yeah, so I mean the states are the main opponents, obviously, for both.

SPEAKER_00 20:57

However, they pose different threats to different governments. So in the case of Mali and Burkina Faso, I would say that JNI is more the existential threat when compared to ISSP. However, in Niger, that's the opposite. ISSP is the most dominant actor and also poses a much more existential threat to Niame. And that's why we maybe in in in recent days have seen reports about negotiations between the Nigerian government and JNI. Because if Niame could find some form of truce with JNI, they can focus more efforts on ISSP. However, the creation of the alliance of Sahel states, which comprise Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, is in a way an alliance of solidarity between countries that share a quite similar trajectory in that they have experienced successive coups. The response to the insurgency has been largely military in different ways. In Mali, You have the regime partnering with Russia, initially Wagner, now its successor, the Africa Corps. In Burkina Faso, you have this popular mobilization through the volunteers for the defense of the homeland, which has been a quite broad mobilization of the civilian population to train and arm them to combat the insurgency. But there are challenges with, you know, the VDP program suffering quite significant setbacks. They are on the front lines in remote villages. And the state in many areas only have a presence in population centers or administrative capitals. So there is this kind of island-like geography when looking at the state compared to the influence that militant groups have in the more rural terrain.

SPEAKER_02 22:51

Yeah, that's super interesting. This notion that, you know, with Niger engaging with JNE, what they're effectively saying is that the only people who can handle ISSP might be another jihadi group. This is the more acceptable and potentially leading to the normalization of engagements with JNM across the Sahel. My concern that I think a number of jihadi groups are going to end up overtaking the government in many countries. And then ISSP becomes their insurgent problem to deal with. Or these armed communities are the seeds for the problems 10 years down the road, where you have some of these governments who may or may not be, in fact, from these jihadi groups, coming up with the same problems that the current government has to deal with. And there are just not a lot of options about how to deal with rural insurgencies within Sahelian states, other than a long, protracted, drawn-out conflict that takes on different characteristics over time, whether it's an ethnic one like the Toueg rebellion or a religious flavor like these new Islamists.

SPEAKER_00 23:52

Yeah. And I mean the ethnic uh component is also quite significant because the militia fiction in the region, I mean, it was not long ago that Niger announced that they are also embarking on a similar project by creating the Domolide Lady, which is basically self-defense units similar to the to the VDP. And I mean, what it basically has done is to deepen cleverages at the communal level between various ethnic groups, especially pastoralists on one hand and farmer communities on the other. And we see the continuation of similar trends and the same issues that has been dragging along over time.

SPEAKER_02 24:36

I mean, I can imagine that you and I in 10 years we'll be having a discussion about the new groups that have their origins in these very communal militias we're talking about today. But if you were going to say the things that you are particularly worried about within the next two years, what would they be?

SPEAKER_00 24:52

My main concern is probably that we will see more of this economic warfare that JM has been carrying out in the southern and western parts of Mali, drone warfare, even if it's still just a portion of the broader repertoire of these groups, it still poses an emerging threat, not only to infrastructure, various enterprises, but also to civilian safety. And I think the civilian harm element is something that has been somewhat overlooked over the past years. It really has taken the back seat in the conversation.

SPEAKER_02 25:27

Yeah, I agree with you there. Overall, I I think that it's a region that will continue to see not just a sustained level of fighting, but we've seen an increase over the last 14 years. And if we go forward into a situation where JNM is legitimized in some ways because of their seeming abilities to deal with the ISSP threat, again, it's like it's at the forefront of I think how some countries are trying to deal with the jihadi threat, but it's also an admittance that they can't suppress it. That in fact these movements for better, better versions or worse versions will end up being a part of the political architecture of these countries and really inherit all of the problems that they have created. And and so too have the government created within these countries. And there's no real hope for the Sahel becoming safer, more peaceful, or indeed even less attractive to these militants within the next future period.

SPEAKER_00 26:26

Yeah, I mean I would say even the opposite. The the region is but becoming much more appealing to even foreign fighters coming from North Africa, where previous insurgencies have died down since 2015-2016, with the fall of SIRT in Libya and also Bengal Dan, or the failed attempt to seize the border town of Bengal Dan in Tunisia. And we have seen this kind of southward shift over the years. And I mean it has continued to even reach co coastal West Africa. And even looking at a group like Jainim, it's increasingly localized. And that also applies to ISSP, but there's still this kind of triangle with support from Libya, Islamic State Central to some extent, but also Nigeria. We see that both the Lake Shad basin conflict and the Sahel is becoming increasingly interconnected with what we see developing in North Central and Northwest Nigeria.

SPEAKER_02 27:28

Yeah, that is super important. In part because when we think about their diffusion into coastal West Africa or into Nigeria, it's not going to be a repeat of everything that's just happened within Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger, because it adopts and adapts to the situation it finds itself in. And that's maybe one of the more frightening aspects of modern conflict. The evolution is a nice way of putting the adaptation that these groups can show, whether or not they become, you know, a territory-less active militia, or whether or not they try to attack the government uh institutions or adopt or recruit local political players in order to stand in for them. All of the different ways this could emerge doesn't mean that what it looks like in Nigeria is going to be the same as what it looks like in Benin, but it will be suited for both of those areas very well.

SPEAKER_00 28:19

Yeah, and I think they both have developed their respective strategic blueprints. In the case of ISSP, we have seen them engage in mass atrocities in new areas, for instance, in the Dosso region, in Tawa on the border with Nigeria, due to allegations against local communities informing on their movements or that local farmers have pursued, for instance, pastoralists for cattle theft, and that has triggered some mass killings. So they try to emulate these various approaches elsewhere, and so far they have been quite successful.

SPEAKER_02 28:55

The governments of these respective next stage countries, whether it's Nigeria or the littoral states in coastal West Africa, they should be understanding what their vulnerabilities are and how that might uniquely affect the strategy of both JNEM and ISSP in their incursions, right? What we're dealing with, with let's say the northwest of Nigeria, is quite different than the north part of Mali, Togo, Ghana. But the strategy of these groups is going to be to adopt practices that will allow them to best situate themselves in that place. So, any idea about whether or not those governments are taking that advice from the region-wide training camp that the Sahel has become for fighters?

SPEAKER_00 29:39

Yeah, so so one thing I think it's important to also not miss out on is the hybridity of the Sahel and insurgency because these groups they really mix community self-defense with criminal activities in order to finance and resource themselves, but also in that they also are jihadi groups or they abide to this kind of extremist ideology. Hybridity is also an important component on how they engage with communities. I think a country like Benin, from conversations I had with Beninese officials, they really understand that you can't neglect the communities. They are the center of gravity of these groups. So I think that is an important lesson that some of these countries may have learned from looking at the evolution of the conflict in the Sahel.

SPEAKER_02 30:32

That's really fascinating. So I will say that what we've learned from this conversation is that this emergent constellation of different groups and trainings that can happen within the Sahel, maybe it's quite similar to how Libya operated during the 80s. And we all know the kind of ongoing ramifications for how that worked for militant groups throughout the world for several decades afterwards. So the intensity of the Sahelian conflict is not staying in the Sah, but it's being exported and it's evolving according to the local circumstances it comes in contact with.

SPEAKER_00 31:10

It really evolves at all levels, not only geographically expanding, but also transfer of trade craft. I think that is kind of triangle between Libya, Nigeria, and the Sahel with these different affiliates sort of coordinating efforts in order to boost each other in various ways. And I mean, we've seen Islamic State Central dispatch trainers or instructors to the Lake Shad Basin. I mean, it's very kind of common to view it in the propaganda. And also how Islamic State kind of repurposes and adapts pre-existing kind of connections from the Sahel to the Maghreb countries, for instance, Moroccan trainers being dispatched or deployed elsewhere in the region. And in even as far as Somalia with the local Islamic State affiliate over there. So yeah, it is a conflict that is evolving geographically, but also technologically, and not only drones, but the use of Starlink, new ways of communication, financing through digital, mobile-based applications. And I also think that the state response is also evolving. So it's not like these states are stagnant. They have acquired military hardware, armed drones that they use quite extensively in order to kind of try to suppress or mitigate the threat, but you can't really reconquer territory from afar or by air alone. So, I mean, there are so many different kinds of challenges that these states are facing in order to mitigate the insurgency. And at the same time, it has become entrenched quite deeply, which makes it really hard to uproot.

SPEAKER_02 32:54

Yeah, of course. And I think it really speaks to the fact that we may have focused on the wrong things when talking about African conflict as a global conflict analyst community, because this is the legacy, these franchises that can emerge and be exportable is really going to be a continuing threat. In addition to the smaller conflicts that have placed people in a lot of harm and have have destroyed governments, these enormous, very successful versions of training plus export that's happening in the Sahel is really going to be a global problem.

SPEAKER_00 33:28

Absolutely. For many years, the Sahel has been a sort of CT laboratory. It was really the case with France and the US being more involved, but it has taken a different kind of shape now with, you know, the various local responses and the variety of solutions that states adopt to confront these types of threats.

SPEAKER_02 33:53

All right. Well, with that, I'm gonna thank Henny very much for his excellent insights and time, and we hope to see you back here on Conflicts of Interest soon. Thank you, everybody.

SPEAKER_00 34:04

Thank you.

SPEAKER_01 34:05

You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest with Professor Cleaner Raleigh, brought to you by ACLED, the world's leading source of political violence and protest data. Subscribe so you never miss an episode, and follow us on socials for updates in the meantime.