The Horn of Africa Crisis the West is getting completely wrong

The Horn of Africa is the most consequential and least understood region in the world right now and Western analysis is making it worse.

In this episode, ACLED founder Professor Clionadh Raleigh is joined by ACLED's regional experts to break down dynamics in Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, and Somalia.

Russia and China are watching. But it's the UAE and Saudi Arabia that are in the room, funding factions, brokering deals, and projecting power in ways that Western foreign policy simply isn't built to see.

They discuss why the Sudan conflict defies standard narratives about civil war, what the Ethiopia war reveals about the limits of international intervention and how Eritrea's role is almost entirely absent from Western coverage. 

Plus - with eyes on Iran and the Middle East, why The Gulf states' strategic interests remain in the Horn.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

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Transcript

SPEAKER_03 0:00

There is everything to play for in the horn, which is why you're seeing everybody make their moves, even if those moves totally contradict what the moves were last year.

SPEAKER_01 0:09

Why is it that you think people know so little about what is going on in these countries? Conflicts of interest brought to you by Accled.

SPEAKER_03 0:25

Hello everybody and welcome to Conflicts of Interest. My name is Clean O'Raley, and I'm here today with, as always, the lovely Braun and two more very lovely people from Accled, both Jalale and Nohad. And today's subject is the Horn of Africa. So we've referred to it several times over recent podcasts. And then today we're going to dive in very specifically to Ethiopia, from which Jalale is both from and an expert in. And of course, Sudan Nohad is joining us again. She is an expert in that conflict. And I am a very interested party. And Braun, of course, will lead the conversation.

SPEAKER_01 1:00

So welcome. Thanks all for joining us. We are talking about the area just across the Red Sea from the Middle East, the region where local conflicts and global trade routes and all sorts of international rivalries are increasingly overlapping. And so, despite the importance of that, many people know surprisingly little about what is actually happening there. So I'd like to start right at the very beginning so that we can get on with the good stuff. When we say the Horn of Africa, which countries are we talking about?

SPEAKER_03 1:28

I can take that one given that I'm a geography professor. So generally, what we're speaking about here is, of course, Somalia, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and increasingly people also include Sudan and South Sudan, of course, Kenya on occasion, and Uganda also on occasion. So basically, it is countries that border the Red Sea. It has a very distinctive horn shape, which is one of the reasons it's called the Horn. But I would say that the countries that people seem most interested in are the countries where we're seeing pretty significant, often perpetual geopolitical moves and conflict. And in this region, that would effectively mean both Ethiopia and Sudan, which is why they're represented here today with both Jalale and Nohad, and troublemakers like uh Eritrea. But we will also, of course, speak about Somalia given that it was opposition problems with the government in Mogadisha over the last few days. That's of course a conflict that's been ongoing now for several decades, but that's generally what people are talking about and why it's a big concern.

SPEAKER_01 2:32

And as far as the strategic importance of the region, when we've said we've mentioned it in passing, it was not just randomly come up, right? We are discussing all sorts of other bits and bobs that are in the news, and there is a relevance to the horn in those. What is the strategic importance of this region?

SPEAKER_03 2:49

The strategic importance is in part these very important choke points where the horn has a very significant influence over, so it's called the Babel Mandar, and Yemen is incredibly close to the Horn in Somalia, and so that route, of course, up to the Suez Canal, that important region, of course, Saudi Arabia is on one side with Yemen and then Ethiopia, Djibouti, etc. Djibouti has several bases in it. In fact, the the very fact that many countries have based themselves in Djibouti should underscore the importance of this area strategically for the global security, but also trade security. But there's also the problem that this incredibly strategic and geopolitically important zone in Africa is rife with conflicts that tend to last decades and shape shift and they're incredibly flexible to the actual leadership of countries. It has been in kind of perpetual conflict for many decades, you know, even far longer than Somalia itself has been in conflict. So it's an area that is both complex and important.

SPEAKER_01 3:53

And so I'd be interested in everybody's view on this next one, because as experts on this, why is it that you think people know so little about what is going on in these countries?

SPEAKER_02 4:05

From my perspective, especially when we talk about Sudan, first of all, it's always seen as this very complicated situation compared to other conflicts where you can describe them in, let's say, two, three sentences. Here we would have to talk for an hour to describe just one conflict because it usually starts with the outside two parties, but then it grows and involves many more actors, whether they're local or regional. And that's the situation currently in most of these conflicts and potential conflicts as well in the region. So I guess that's why people think of it as this very complex web and just move away from trying to explain it because it is quite complicated given the different intertwined alliances and rivalries. It's a good point.

SPEAKER_01 4:52

And and what would you say, Jalale? Is that the same when we're talking about the history?

SPEAKER_00 4:56

Yes, I agree with what Nohad said, but I would also like to mention that it's also related to how the mainstream media is also framing the conflicts in the region and also lack of interest as well. The international media or the mainstream media operates heavily on shock value, what's interest to their audience, and most of the time that's the Western countries and so on, and they tend to cover conflicts and so on closer to these countries, proximity as well. So there is shared identity and explicit geopolitical alliances. Because of this, the mainstream media tend not to report or show what's going on in these countries. Therefore, even though what's happening in the Horn of Africa is at the same level as the conflict, for example, in Ukraine and so on, there is not that much coverage when it comes to the conflict in this region.

SPEAKER_03 5:53

I'm gonna come in on that because I do think it's important to emphasize that the shock value of the horn is really often misinterpreted. The Tigray War in 2020, 2021, 2022 is a really good example of this where the Western media took a position that was quite apart from the facts on the ground, but equally representing what the majority of Ethiopians in this case had thought about this particular conflict with the North. And it relies on either massive numbers of fatalities to get in the news or a misrepresentation of the sides and what they want, in order for, as others have said, the shock value for these conflicts to reach the Western audiences. But I will say that in the other parts of the world, in particular in the Middle East, what's happening in the horn is super important. And there's often quite an elite level of interest, although, you know, just generally quite a low public level of interest, both in conflicts more generally, but also in conflicts that like defy easy slogans to define what the issues are.

SPEAKER_01 6:57

It's a really good point, because actually we've been talking amongst my friends at the moment about the political situation in the UK, for example. And I maintain that the parties at the moment with the most support is because they have the the catchiest slogans. Like it's far easier to remember stop the boats than it is the ones that involve more than three words, right? And so it's it's kind of being able to simplify it maybe where you lose people. But to pick up on your point, Clino, about the actual implications of this, they're worldwide, they're far-reaching. And whilst everyone's talking about the Middle East, I think we've established that that there's the kind of missing piece, certainly in the understanding. But to what extent does what's happening in the Horn of Africa influence, say, the Gulf states? You've got interested parties in Saudi and the UAE, right?

SPEAKER_03 7:42

There's a huge amount of UAE influence in the Gulf in particular. We've done a separate podcast on that. Both Saudi and the UAE interest different parties. Of course, that can be referred back to the Sudan episode, but also the one we did specifically on the Gulf. And there's competition in the Middle East, and particularly the Gulf states, about the influence they have over both government actors and non-state actors, for example, the RSF in Sudan. However, I would say that the Iran war has several, let's say, long tales. And one of those long tales is what's going to happen within the Red Sea and how Saudi Arabia may want to reassert its dominance over that area. And if wanting to do so, it requires partners. One of the points we made in the previous podcast is that there were these kind of teams that were being generated. So one team looked like it was Saudi Egypt, Eritrea, and in fact SAF with Somalia. That is, excuse me for saying Nahad, like a pretty weak team. But the UAE had Ethiopia and unfortunately the RSF, which is a real kind of a real bad spot in its reputation that it is cultivating within the horn. And that's a much stronger team in the sense that you've got a lot of money in UAE and you've got a lot of strength within the Ethiopian government. And then you had them betting on what is now the kind of losing party in the Sudanese war. But my sense is that these teams have not necessarily shifted who's in them, but they certainly have shifted the outcomes that they're seeking within the Horn, given that the situation in the Gulf has gone so poorly. It has just really upped the stakes of what's going to happen within the Red Sea and who's going to be your partner in the region.

SPEAKER_01 9:25

So, Nohad, I wonder if this is a good opportunity for you to tell us a little bit more about the RSF and the kind of dynamics that are going on that are influencing what Kleina mentioned.

SPEAKER_02 9:33

When we look at these teams that Clina was just talking about, I think it's important to also look at why are these countries kind of interested and how has this level of interest shifted from, let's say, how it was like in the beginning of the conflict in Sudan and now. So in the beginning, in 2023, the UAE had the highest stakes. Saudi Arabia was was like, we don't like the UAE supporting the RSF, but they weren't very heavily involved as they are now. And this is because I think over the years many shifts happen in all of these neighboring countries and the regional dynamics. And now the situation is like the UAE, well, its interest mostly in Sudan is related to a couple of things. One of them access to the Red Sea through Port Sudan, which currently it still doesn't have because the SAF's uh territory is on that side. It's also interested in gold and it's interested in the agricultural land because that's how it secures food security in the UAE. Food is imported, so the food security aspect is also a part of the interest in Sudan. So these things, Saudi Arabia would have a similar interest, but it still wasn't at that level of being so heavily invested in Sudan. That investment came later, and now I think in 2026 we're seeing more of it. Now it's becoming clearer because partly the rift that happened between UAE and Saudi Arabia in relation to Yemen, which was in December, and then a series of things that happened, these different alliances that Jalali can speak more about, the Ethiopia and Eritrea side. So that currently positioned the SAF as the reliable partner for Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia is now much more clear and uh vocal about its support for the army as opposed to how it was previously. I would agree with Klina that the RSF is now kind of on the losing side when we look at the territorial shifts and the situation in Sudan. But also that doesn't mean that the conflict can end just by the army blocking the RSF because the RSF still has access to advanced weapons and drones through the UAE support. So that makes it a perpetual state of conflict. But I would be interested to also hear what Jalali has to say about the Ethiopian side.

SPEAKER_01 11:50

Yeah, no, me too, because I think there was there was a spat of news. We talked about the kind of media awareness and what people were paying attention to. And it there was definitely a phase where lots of people were talking about Sudan, weren't they? And I know we mentioned shock value. There certainly was a lot of that going on. But Jalale, your areas of interest hardly see the light of day, right?

SPEAKER_00 12:09

Well, it depends on the title. For example, when the conflict was going on in northern Ethiopia, the narrative was eye-catching, so there was a lot of report from that side. But as Klina said, most of this report didn't represent the facts and also didn't show what the majority was expressing in general and didn't show exactly what's happening in the country. When we see the alliances taking back the conversation, I would like to see it in different phases. For example, pre-Israel's recognition of Somaliland and post, and then how the Iran conflict affected that. So the pre-Israel recognition of Somaliland, there was different alliances, as Nohat said, for example, uh Saudi Arabia was not that vocal about what's going on in Sudan at that time and it was not officially supporting as well as SAF and so on. They were trying to act as a neutral country alongside with the US to bring peace in the country and to bring the two fighting actors to the negotiation table. But after Israel organized Somaliland, what we observed is that the alliance started to shift. For example, there was a lot of visits by different actors to Addis. For example, the Israeli representative officials came to Addis, which is the capital of Ethiopia for those who don't know. There was a visit from the Turkey president, there was also a visit from the UAE, there was a visit from Saudi Arabia, there was a visit from the US, so there was a lot of visits showing to us that there was change of alliances, there was negotiations behind closed doors. While this was happening, because the recognition happened in December last year, in January, February, these meetings were happening. Amazingly, within two weeks, all these meetings were happening in February, but by the end of February and so on, the conflict started in Iran, which seemed to pause these negotiations and shifted the interest within the region. After that, when the Israel recognized Somaliland, we saw a visible shift that Klina mentioned, for example, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Somalia came together and they formed a new alliances by, for example, blocking their airspace for UAE, which UAE was using to transport allegedly to the Aresiv through Libya and so on. The Libya airspace was also closed. So we were seeing this collaboration before the start of the Iran conflict. So the Iran conflict has shifted interest because it's also affecting the UAE in Saudi Arabia. And now nobody wants another instability at the Red Sea, which is a very vital route for trades, for security. So we are still seeing alliances happening, but I don't think the alliances are said and done. They are still open. For example, the Ethiopian government is still open. I see that. The South is also open. So we might see further alliances happening. For example, what would be the contribution of Russia? I know China loves to move in silence, but what will be their contribution? And what other techniques could the UAE and Saudi Arabia use to secure their interest in the Red Sea as well as in the Horn of Africa is open for all of us to keep an eye on.

SPEAKER_03 15:32

I just want to hop onto a few of those points because they're very important, which is that there is everything to play for in the Horn, which is why you're seeing everybody make their moves, even if those moves totally contradict what the moves were last year. That is not going to hold anybody back at the moment. And these visits to Addis and to Abi, who is in the West seen as a destructive or anti-democratic leader, and to, in fairness, also inside Ethiopia to some degree. But the degree of interest in Abi at the moment is telling us very clearly that Ethiopia is considered the strongest actor in this region. Allying with Ethiopia or getting on that side is going to be really key to whatever geopolitical territorial shape is going to come from the Horn. There is a few things that we can, I think, all agree on, which is that there is territorial change in the future of that region. The countries we currently see will not look the same, maybe in a year, maybe in two years, but there will be shifts. And with that, there'll be a real power reorganization. And Ethiopia is currently set to benefit from that massively. The second thing I would say, and this is coming back to something that Jalale hasn't mentioned yet, but I think is both important but not as important as the Western press is making out, which is that Ethiopia has just undertaken another election in which Abi Ahmed, the Prime Minister, will certainly be re-elected. But that election doesn't matter, right? It matters in the Western press to show that like he's become a little bit of a a dictator. But it doesn't matter in the region. The the result was already set, and that's important. But equally as important is that the West and what's going on in Tigray, which Jalali wrote a great piece about recently, what's going on in Tigray is a reset of something that really destabilized the Western engagement with Abi in 2020-2021. That replay, almost literally to the word of what's happening is again going to be very poorly taken in Ethiopia because it doesn't need the West to approve of its moves because a lot of the world has changed. And the West simply does not have the clout that it wants to have in that region. And bleaching on about how it doesn't like a particular election is going to further underscore the fact that like people are playing on just totally different fields.

SPEAKER_01 17:49

And it's interesting when you mention that it's all to play for, right? Because we're talking about the UE and Saudi. We know that they're very powerful states. And then Jalali mentioned China and Russia. And so, okay, the West can carry on not understanding because it's too complicated, or talking about the bits that make it sound irrelevant to the day, using the shock factor, like we were saying. But actually, some of these really key global players demonstrating an interest like that with it being all to play for. If you had your eye on something or your money on someone, like where on earth is this going? What's the next step for this?

SPEAKER_03 18:25

I would say, like, my bet is on Abi 100%. He's proven to be quite an agile actor, made some big mistakes both internally within Ethiopia, but also I think the training of the RSF and Benny Shah Ogums, as we mentioned last time, that's a mistake, you know, the way he's been kind of at the beck and coal of UAE to some degree. But these visits that Jalali mentioned earlier indicate that there's also now other options for Abi. I think that this conflict in the north and Tigrai is actually going to play directly into his hands. Tigray has misread the international situation significantly. It thinks that it's 2020, 2021, and it can say that, oh, poor us, we're the vulnerable party. It worked then, it will not work now. And I think that Abi will basically be saying, look at this internal threat that I must get rid of. And therefore, that allows us to kind of reconsider how my neighbor Eritrea is acting as a destabilizing force. We really need to get this in hand. And then he gets sea access, which is exactly what he knows.

SPEAKER_00 19:26

The West have realized that there are other actors that Ethiopia could turn and ask for any assistance or have alliances. Because of this, in the past one month, I want to say, or two months, we have seen also a change from the West. For example, the European Union has lifted the sanction against Ethiopian government, which was posed during the 2020-2022 conflict in northern Ethiopia. The US has removed their sanctions as well on Ability government. And the US held a meeting with Ethiopian foreign ministry in the US to discuss how they can stabilize the region. US have a policy now, any policy saying that we don't want to be directly involved in conflicts. They want to distance themselves, so they might want to use a country which seems strong in a specific region. So at this moment it seems like they are turning back to Ethiopia and trying to resolve the conflict using Ethiopia. We don't know what's being said behind closed doors, but we can assume what's coming next. When you ask what's coming next, Ethiopia, I think as Klina said, the election doesn't matter. I don't know why people are talking about it. We know who's going to lead, who's going to win. The election is just stress multiplier. This is what we have seen the past one week. Since last week, because the election was last Monday, so since last Friday, the already existing armored groups, the Fano militias, the Oromo Liberation Army, OLA, and so on, they initiated a new round of violence to disrupt the election that happened. And it seems like now, this week or after the election, things will calm down compared to what happened in like two days before the election and on the election day and so on. What we need to keep an eye is, as I said in my recently published Accolid report, is that what's going to happen in Tugray. How is TPLIF going to continue? For example, TPLIF took over the Tigray regional government and reinstated the previous council, ignoring the interim government established because of the peace agreement. I think the next step for TPA Lev is to take the disputed Western Tigray, which also borders Sudan. And on the same day the TPA Lev reinstated the regional government, SAF in Sudan, Khartoum accused the Ethiopian government of launching drone strikes which attacked Khartoum. And the same week, SAF also mobilized. It hopes near to the Ethiopian border, specifically near to the western Tugrai. So the opposition groups, including TP Lev, the Earth activists, and other insurgent groups, have also met in Port Sudan in mid-May after the SAF accused. So there are some tensions happening, so we should keep an eye on what's happening in Tukrai in Ethiopia. For Somalia, as Klina said previously, the government has been fighting As-Shaba for decades. And since the current government took over, they tried to push back Al-Shabaab from its stronghold and so on, they managed to do that. But the political dispute among the current government and all the opposition, specifically now related with the election, might distract them from their fight against Al-Shabaab. So this might provide Al-Shabaab an opportunity to further expand and recontrol territories and push back the government's security. So the past two days we have seen violence happening in Mokati Show within the green zone, which led to various international governments releasing statements for every side to come down and come back to negotiation table. So for Somalia, consensus among every actor is very important to be peaceful and at least for them to continue fighting Al-Shabaab. Al-Shawab is not only active in Somalia, it's also active in Kenya. We have seen different activities happening by Al-Shawab in Kenya and also Ethiopia. So it's not only one country's problem, it's the regions and also the international community because of its affiliation with Al-Qaeda. I don't know whether we would like to include South Sudan, but I will give the floor to Nohad to talk about Sudan.

SPEAKER_01 23:42

Just before we go to Sudan, I'm really interested. Do statements from governments saying please calm down work?

SPEAKER_00 23:50

It doesn't work at all, but it shows their interest. You know, for example, the statements given for the last election for Ethiopia that happened on Monday is just a statement. The same is happening for Somalia. So it doesn't push any actor because as I said, each actor has alternatives now. They are not only based on the Western countries anymore, they have other supporters. So the statements are just a statement for those countries and uh for us to follow. But other than that, it doesn't make any difference that we have noticed so far.

SPEAKER_03 24:23

I have a question for Nohat actually that maybe she can jump in on, which is that do you think SAF will change its position despite it being bombed at or getting incoming? And what's it done in the past with the Ethiopian government? And of course, like Ron's question, which is who would you bet on?

SPEAKER_02 24:39

Yeah, I think that's a good question because recently, whenever we're having conversations about what's going to happen, I think since 2026 started, it's mostly been, well, we need to also look at Ethiopia and Libya and these kinds of like border dynamics. Because in addition to what Jadal already said about the SAF hosting TPLF in Sudanese territory, I think a lot of this depends on what's going to happen in the Blue Nile region. Because at the moment the army is advancing, and for context, the Blue Nile region is also bordering Ethiopia in the Benishangul region, and that's where the RSF has a training camp set up there across the border. And so from what we're seeing, it seems like the army's strategy is it wants to advance in the Blue Nile, make sure that the RSF's influence there is very limited, mostly to its allies, which are like the SPLM North, this group, this kind of small local alliance. It's possible that the SAF is going to be okay with just pushing them to a certain reach a certain region, and then beyond that, it's going to shift its attention to the Darfur region, which is the stronghold of the RSF. But now that we have the TPLF dynamics and that's also going on, in my opinion, I think the Army doesn't want to level up its support for the TPLF, especially with more advanced weapons, drones, things like that. I don't expect that the army wants to do that, at least from what I'm seeing. First of all, because there's still a lot to do in Sudan, like in regards to the conflict with the RSF. And it's not like the Army has endless supplies. Its supplies are actually very limited in terms of especially like advanced drones and air defense systems and things like that. And so I think that's a feature that's different from the type of alliances that we saw previously in like the 80s and 90s, where it was very common for these neighboring countries to interfere in each other's affairs. Sudan supported opposition groups in Ethiopia against Mengestu's regime. But back then I think it was a different situation because although now it is still the same thing that's characterized by shifting alliances and transactional alliances and things like that. Now we have the introduction of drones and advanced weapons. So these are also considered to be something that changes conflict dynamics. And this is what shifted the conflict in Sudan. If it wasn't for drones and advanced weapons supplied to the RSF, maybe the conflict wouldn't have lasted this long. So if the TPLF moves forward with these offensives that Jalali was talking about, who would be willing to support the TPLF to a high level beyond just training camps and the softer type of support that it's now getting from the army? So I think my answer to Cleanet's question is I don't think the army wants to continue its support beyond this level just because it's not really something that's strategic enough for it to pursue. I also don't think that Ethiopia's support for the RSF is beneficial beyond the UAE's pressure. I think the UAE's pressure on Ethiopia is a main factor for why Ethiopia is kind of facilitating some things for the RSF, but also equally it doesn't want to get involved at a higher level than that. But I would be curious to also hear your thoughts.

SPEAKER_03 28:06

I really do think that we're onto something here in that the horn looks like it has the same extremely complex dynamics, but really both the agents that are making these dynamics really move, which there's pretty fortified uh governments within the horn itself, means that people can often misread this as a continuation of the 80s, or they misread it as we should look at these conflicts as, you know, a humanitarian crisis first, or really through the lens that we at the West might be much more comfortable looking at them through. But that's the wrong way of understanding what's happening here, both in terms of the frontline adoption of some of these technologies across Africa change, the interest of these competing middle powers, especially from the Gulf in this region, the very high likelihood of territorial change that is in many ways going to happen because it's beneficial to some of these middle powers or these rising powers much more so than the status quo is. And then also the just general change of people not taking the Western lens to understand these conflicts in general is forcing us to look at the reality of these conflicts, how they are actually playing out, rather than maybe the kind of outpush or the kind of ending that we would have wanted or expected.

SPEAKER_02 29:21

I can just also add to that, which also aligns with what Jalali was saying about how statements don't really matter very much. And I was actually looking at that yesterday. I was trying to see, well, if we wanted to rate these alliances based on which one is strong and which one is weak, then what can we look at? And I think the only thing we can look at is just what's observed, which is these very like covert moves. But if we only look at, let's say, political statements, I think they're almost meaningless in this region.

SPEAKER_01 29:54

It's a fascinating concept where we keep coming back to that kind of Western lens approach. Because I mean Clean and I have been talking about, I mean, insert conflict here, and we'll say, well, you know, it's a bit Game of Thrones like because that's what people have come to understand about this party and then this other party, and and that's that maybe a dragon is a drone. But the getting over that bit, I think, is fascinating and it's it's been really interesting to listen to you guys and unpick that for one. So I wondered then whether we might touch on the role that Eritrea plays.

SPEAKER_03 30:25

Actually, I have to take back my statements from earlier about how this isn't a modern and uh transfigured region because Eritrea is pulling the same stuff that it's been pulling now for several decades. Afuerki is just, he loves playing the kind of, you know, unstable joker, the unstable instigator in this region. He loves it. He neither benefits nor does it have a huge cost because he basically runs the place like a little North Korea. And he just wants to destroy the plans of others who might seek to benefit either from Eritrea's geopolitical positioning or its actual geography, more so than anything else. But he's a total troublemaker, that fella, and always has been. But maybe Jalale feels nicer about it.

SPEAKER_00 31:09

This will give me also an opportunity to answer Nohad's question of who will support TPLF by providing drones and other sophisticated uh weapons. My answer is the Aithrian government. Since the alliances changed, for those who don't know, during the northern Ethiopia conflict between 2020 and 2022, the alliances was TPLF was by itself in the territory, and the Artrian government was aligned with the Ethiopian government along with Fano militias. But after the signing of the Pretoria peace agreement, uh the alliances has shifted. So the current alliance is that the Airtrian government has sided with TPLF. So currently, TPLF is based in Tugrai for those who don't know, and Tugrai borders the border between Aertria and Ethiopia, basically between Tugrai, is completely open. They can go and enter, they can give any weapons and so on. There is no visibility there. So even though the drones changed the dynamic of the 2020-2022 conflict to the federal government, because at that time TPL didn't have any drones at that time. We know that now the top TPL uh officials are telling us how they tried to acquire these weapons, but they were not successful at that time. But at this moment, I think they have it. They have some kind of drone, and that's part of why the TPLE is taking this change within the CRI. So Ethere is playing a very big role when it comes to Ethiopia in this way. They are also supporting allegedly, let's say, some members of Fano militias, and there are also rumors of them working with the OLA. I don't want to jump a lot to Sudan as well, but I know that for Sudan as well, Kazala state and so on, they have been training different armored groups, ethnic groups, and so on within their own territory. They are also hosting expensive drones and other jets and so on within their territories for staff in Sudan. So they are hosting it to keep it safe from the aggressive drone strikes. So ERTRA is playing a big role in this situation.

SPEAKER_03 33:21

I really think that like a lot of TPLF is all talk. They're all talk about digging themselves up, but effectively, this is a group that lost the conflict, right? Suffered terrible atrocities, often at the hands of these Eritreans that they're now allied to, or so claim to be allied to. But we've got the same characters in the TPLF, minus a few of the more effective ones. And we have the same population in Tigrae, none of whom are able to really amount to much in terms of having the same level of military experience or weaponry that they would have five, six years ago, and it's all bloody talk. Eritrea has basically two pennies to rub together. It might have gotten a stray drone from here there, wherever, but this is all just an attempted repeat of a war that they lost. They actually lost it, and then they told their people that they won.

SPEAKER_01 34:14

It's an absolute travesty what's going on. Do you recognize that sort of, I don't know, rematch due over making it up, giving it the PR that they wanna they wanna give it, Jalale?

SPEAKER_00 34:24

The thing is that previously when the conflict was happening in 2020-2022, the Tigrai people didn't have the full information. So even though the TPA Leaf lost, but they told him that they won and they forced the federal government to sign the peace agreement. But what they did following the peace agreement, saying that we didn't agree with the content and so on, is another issue. But now the Tigrai people have seen what happened during that time and after that, so they don't have the same support or the same mobilization they had in the first round of the conflict. The other issue is that the current function of TPA liv, whether purposely or not, they are not willing to understand the dynamic happening around Ethiopia and the shift that's happening around Ethiopia when it comes to the government and so on. Those who knows what happened in the 1970s, in 1990, you can see that they are using the same techniques they used at that time, which we have seen it during the first round of the conflict. We are not talking as if the second round of the conflict started, but we are assuming that some kind of violence is coming, but they used the same technique they used in 1990, or before that, before they controlled the government. So because of that, I agree in somehow, but the border is open. And there are also invisible hands behind Ertrea who can provide also the weapons, so it might not only be Aertria.

SPEAKER_03 35:57

I I see that point about the invisible hand. I just don't think that any hand looks like they want Ethiopia to go through yet another destabilizing conflict. I guess my bigger issue here is that the TPLF is presenting the Tigrae people or presenting them up for another conflict that they are neither prepared for nor that they are going to come out well from at all. I mean, it's just further destruction again and again and again because of this absolutely unbelievably unfair and I would say almost criminal expectation that they should be running Ethiopia rather than just be in Tigray. And it continues to grow like a cancer in that country. And Abi has not helped by how he's certainly acted in Amhara and elsewhere. But the TPLF seem to think that they can just go for another round and all it will lead to is destruction.

SPEAKER_01 36:48

When Jalale said, whether it's accidental or not, not willing to understand. I think that's a incredible sentence.

SPEAKER_03 36:56

They just they just think that they should be running the place. Like this is the exact same TPLF that ran the place in fairness for 28 years, not particularly well. And now when that has been shifted to groups, especially that are numerically superior within the country, they believe it's theirs. They believe they're entitled to this and that it's been taken from them and they're going to get it back through violence and through these absolutely malicious alliances that they have fostered. And the people who pay the cost for this are both the Tigray people themselves, who have not had a decent, well-functioning government now for about a decade. Jalali, you can correct me if I'm wrong there. But also the people in Amhara who border this region and who suffer terribly from the conflict, and of course, those from the Aroma region that they sent up there. But it's it's all a travesty and a waste.

SPEAKER_00 37:46

Jalali, did you have anything to pick up from that point from Kleena? The conflict is very destructive for the region and also for the neighboring regions, for Tigrai, for Amhara, for Afar region as well. And it's also affecting Ethiopia in general. So it would be great. I wish that everyone just could sit and find a solution for their incompatible disagreement instead of picking up weapons. But unfortunately, it's not where we are, and it seems like another round of violence is heading to that region. And I feel very uh sad for the civilians living uh in this region.

SPEAKER_01 38:24

I was going to ask them whether we might sort of conclude with what the kind of wish, like you mentioned just now, for for the region might be, or for your particular area, and then also what the kind of worst maybe next case scenario might be. And I think the great part of today's conversation has been the unpicking of all of those different dynamics, and it's both sort of within each of the different countries within the region, and then between the countries, and then the spillover and and kind of beyond, and being able to explain why the the Western lens doesn't necessarily work. So with the election, for example, the lens from the West is as simple as elections matter. And so to be able to unpick this one does not matter, it was kind of guaranteed and and have that sort of explanation is really helpful to understand. So again, what's the kind of best and worst thing that you're waiting to see next?

SPEAKER_00 39:15

The worst thing is witnessing the same level of conflict that happened between 2020 and 2022 with the same, I don't want to say ignorance, but the same siding of the waste to what did it like similar things happening at this moment while we are having a very devastating conflict in Sudan as well, is and also if the dispute in Somalia is not settled peacefully, like the large countries in this region will be in a very devastating conflict. It will be devastating for the civilians and also for the region stability and so on, and it won't stop there because we also have South Sudan, which we don't mention in detail here, but South Sudan is also going through a very violent conflict, and it's also related to with the upcoming election, which they are supposed to help this year if they are going to. So the Sudan conflict could pull in also Chad, Uganda, and others. So it's it's not going to be only staying within the region. As we also discussed at the beginning, we also have different players. We only talked about the Gulf. We have the West. We have the East. We have different actors eyeing the region because it's that important for the global trade and security. So it's a very sensitive country. So that's the worst part. My best wishes is for everyone, like being very naive, and I don't know anything about research and so on, let's assume. And my wish is for everyone just to sit at the table and discuss their differences. Because as Nohad said, the conflict in Sudan seemed at the beginning it was a power struggle between the heads of SAF and RSF. If only they could sit together and try to resolve, it won't expand. Oh, it's too complicated. Same is true for Ethiopia. As Klina said, the TPLF was not willing to give up their power. And it's not the wish of the people. The people would like to live in peace and so on. So if only they could sit at the table and resolve this. I know this is impossible, it seems impossible, but I wish they could do this. The same is true for Somalia instead of uh they are trying to sit together and have a consensus, and it's in their tradition because the clans there they have to have consensus decision instead of one party deciding the whole thing. That's important. They need to understand what's important for their culture and political dynamic. So I wish they could sit and put their fight at the table instead of outside of so that's my wish. The same for South Sudan. I wish they were not competing for economic gains, controlling power, controlling the oil and so on. And for external actors just to leave the the region in peace.

SPEAKER_02 42:05

Lohat, what about you? Of course, I agree with everything Jalali said, and I think that the spillover thing. People have been talking about how there's the risk of spillover, a risk of spillover from Sudan's conflict. I think it's already happening, especially on the side of Chad and South Sudan. South Sudanese mercenaries fought with the RSF and now they have their own weapons from the RSF. They went back to South Sudan and used them in their own conflicts. And this is also a similar thing happening in Chad where the cross-border dynamic is already very, very tense. So I think we're at a stage where if people can contain this now, then there's some hope that it can still be contained within at least minimal uh spillover. But if this continues, and especially to answer your question, Braun, the worst case is if the TPLF launches this offensive and this conflict actually goes in full force. I think that's the worst case, even for Sudan. Not just for the impact on Ethiopia, of course, but even for Sudan. There would be, as Jalali mentioned, that these border regions are very loose. You have a flow of weapons, a flow of mercenaries from both sides, and the worst case scenario is that this can still not be contained because of the local militias just doing their own thing. The best case scenario is, of course, if this is resolved as soon as possible. And in that case, it can be contained just to prevent this flow of weapons, I would say.

SPEAKER_03 43:32

Yeah, that's a really good point. There are things that are more or less likely. Like I think it's more likely that Al Shabaab takes over the state of Somalia relatively soon because the government, potentially, because of its elite coordination, just doesn't have a handle on that state, especially even not just now in Mogadishu, but no longer in Mogadishu either, which is, you know, a very serious development. Al Shabaab is pretty against some of these recognitions that are happening in Somaliland because it's It it represents a significant part and a very important part of the state to it. And so that positions Ethiopia in particular with an enemy at its southern border, that is, and in fact very close to the region that it hopes to dominate, especially because it wanted port access even in ports within Somaliland. I think that depending on how the Gulf states have to contain or possibly in their abilities to contain Iran, their ability to deflect uh resources to keeping the horn going in the direction that will maximally benefit them and their future economic aims and their future geopolitical aims is in question. So if Saudi Arabia and UAE have to place a lot of time, a lot of costs, a lot of material towards simply protecting their own countries from Iran incursions, then that's less material that can go to some of this material and money that can go to their partners within the horn. That's a significant issue. I think that the best case scenario there would be to write off RSF, in which case, if they do so, I would imagine that the RSF, as per the comments earlier, the RSF would kind of locate itself within Darfur and the border in Chad, and that would effectively shift that problem rather than deal with it, which is pretty serious. I don't think that Eritrea is a military problem. I don't think it's militarily significant, but I think that its difficulties in how to deal with that, plus attain of what Ethiopia wants more than anything, which is sea access, is going to be a continuing problem until Ethiopia gets it. And I think that that's some people are trying to negotiate that more so than make sure that it's won through violence, but that's an unknown question at the moment. So to me, there's absolutely no possibility that almost any of these situations are going to be either non-violent or seeking a diplomatic end. They're all going to be violent. It's just that whether or not that violence is going to lead to a clear outcome or just simply lead to more and more people getting involved in conflict is the open question.

SPEAKER_02 46:02

Can I just add one thing, which is I think that's it's implied, but just in case it's not clear, I think that this idea of like negotiation between the warring parties in Sudan, for example, I think both sides already reached the level where they would be willing to sit down and talk, but it this is still not possible because the actual control, for lack of a better term, is in the hand of their patrons, especially for the RSF. Recently said we don't really have anything to do. It's out of our hands. The UAE is controlling everything. They actually said that. And this is one thing that's preventing the talking stage to come, even if both warring parties reach that level of exhaustion, it's still not possible because it's under the control of their Gulf patrons. And that depends on what Kleena said about the war in Iran and how much they're willing to continue their support here.

SPEAKER_01 46:55

So I hope that this episode stands as somewhat of a prescription to the Western ignorance situation that we are up against, or at least a first step. I've really enjoyed our chat today, so I'm so grateful. Thank you. Thanks very much. Thank you for my delight. You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest with Professor Cleaner Raleigh, brought to you by ACLED, the world's leading source of political violence and protest data. Subscribe so you never miss an episode, and follow us on socials for updates in the meantime.