Conflicts of Interest

Inside Myanmar's War: Drones, China & Why nobody's winning

• Season 1 • Episode 34

Share episode

Use Left/Right to seek, Home/End to jump to start or end. Hold shift to jump forward or backward.

0:00 | 33:19

This week on Conflicts of Interest, Professor Clionadh Raleigh and Bron Mills are joined by ACLED's Myanmar expert, Su Mon, to examine why Myanmar's civil war won't end anytime soon despite sweeping early resistance gains.

They break down the fractured battlefield of hundreds of armed groups, the military stalemate between the junta and opposition forces, and how drones, improvised aircraft, and shifting alliances are reshaping the conflict. The conversation explores China's role as the country's most influential external player, and asks why geopolitics continues to outweigh the concerns of three million displaced civilians.

The episode also turns to Iran and Ukraine, where recent escalations have raised fresh questions about the trajectory of both wars, the limits of military force, and what comes next.

From Tehran to Naypyidaw, this episode unpacks the power politics driving today's conflicts—and why understanding them means looking far beyond the battlefield.

For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube. 

Conflicts of Interest: https://www.youtube.com/@ConflictsOfInterestACLED

📱 Did you know you can follow Conflicts of Interest on TikTok?

SPEAKER_00

The current situation is really bad for Myanmar. One in three people are starving. 3.5 million people are displaced. And according to our data, over 100,000 people are killed in conflict-related incidents.

SPEAKER_01

Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.

SPEAKER_02

Welcome to another week of conflicts of interest. My name is Clina Rowley, and I'm here with the lovely Braun and the lovely Sumon as we will be discussing the conflict in Myanmar a bit today, for which Suman is an expert. And before we get started on that, Braun, what tragedies do you have lined up for us?

SPEAKER_01

Well, it's mainly a lot of confusion around what's going on in the Middle East, right? And what to expect next. So basically what's happened over the last few days is all to do with tensions ramping up again. So this is the fresh US strikes on Iran and then the Iranian retaliation against various bases in the Gulf. And I actually saw a really helpful kind of infographic that came out from the EOS risk group a couple of weeks ago. And it's basically a cycle. And it goes from Iran hits a ship, US hits the bases, Iran responds and escalates, Iran targets the Gulf states, further strikes come from the US, then they agree to stop attacking each other, shipping resumes, but the underlying disputes remain unresolved. And then there's a new trigger event and it goes back to bombing a ship. So what I was really interested in, Clino, is how long you think this kind of cycle of stuff is going to continue.

SPEAKER_02

Well, it can continue, I think, indefinitely. It relates to obviously discontent on everybody's end about what's going to happen with the strait. So these are kind of the original sins, you know, of the whole conflict in the first part, which is who controls the strait? And then how much do the Gulf states take of just kind of sheer punishment for the decision to go in as they did to Iran and start this conflict process. And so what I mean that it can continue indefinitely is that what Iran wants for the strait is completely not what anybody else wants for the strait. And so the various solutions that have been attempted to prevent Iran from taking total control, the blockade, the attacks, or even the southern strategy that we discussed two weeks ago, all of those are ways in which people have been trying to work around Iran, right? And Iran cannot let this go, right? It's a it's an extremely important component of their way forward, not just for economic reasons, also, of course, for the strength of the new government. They need to be able to show that they did not give up the crown jewel. But in a third way, it's super important for their future engagement with the Gulf states. Because if they don't have control of the straits, their ability to affect how the Gulf states and Iran kind of goes along in the next few years has been completely eradicated. They become a major problem rather than some sort of a regional hegemon. And so it's the most important feature for Iran, how this goes. And so that cycle, it's not costless to them, right? But it is far less costly than having to negotiate with the US about lessened control over the strait. So we should expect this to continue unless there is some sort of a major knockout, which we have seen the US being unable to produce at this point. I struggle to think that there's any negotiating around this point. They are at diametrically opposed positions here. And of course, in the interim, while this ceasefire or chats have been going on, there have been some kind of positive developments in the sense that the attack ceased for the most part. The price of oil has decreased pretty substantially. I think it's between 72 and 75 at the moment. And so the benefits of it have been kind of maybe banked by everybody. One way to look at this is if they continue this kind of constant back and forth and the strait remained open, this could be fulfilling what the US wants, which is a low oil price, especially leading up to the midterms. They're not attacking Israel, which is quite important. And the reason that that's important is that if they were to bring in Israel, it would start a whole new dimension of this conflict. But that in the same way still works with the US. Okay, so you've got a low oil price, no attacks on Israel. And then the question is whether or not their bases can take incoming constantly. I would say no. But they could go back to their lower strategy of like attacking everything but the bases. And it's not great. But is it something that the US could live with? Potentially. Potentially.

SPEAKER_01

And it's interesting that one point on that cycle is the underlying stuff still remains, right? Because when this began, it wasn't anything to do with the straits. That's come since, right? With the closing and the opening. It didn't feature in the in the top reasons at the beginning.

SPEAKER_02

Yeah, that's a good point. I mean, the top public reasons were not control of the strait, but everything about this had to do with control of the strait. But when I say that that this can continue forever, this will continue forever, you know, like control of the strait will be an issue in 25 years, it will be an issue in 50 years for all sorts of different reasons. So the southern strategy really seemed like, but so too did the blockade, seemed like an interesting power play. And it's just Iran can't let that go unless the cost to Iran is so overwhelming, they have to compromise on that point. And they're nowhere near that point internally.

SPEAKER_01

And then elsewhere in the news, of course, we've got uh lots going on around Ukraine because the Russia has continued that wave of missile and drone strikes, and then Ukraine has continued to attack deep inside Russia, and this is all going on as the European leaders are meeting to discuss more support for Ukraine in that way. I on that kind of notion of what's likely to shift now, what can European leaders actually do at this point to get involved? Is the end in sight? Is there a light at the end of the tunnel at this point?

SPEAKER_02

Well, I mean, I think it will come quite quickly when it comes, but I don't know if it's this predictable, right? They always say this, everybody's fully in until one day they just say we're compromising, we're gonna have this peace deal. But it's very rare. It's actually potentially more common in a situation like Myanmar, which we'll be talking about in a while, whereas that you see the decline in one party's ability to contest so significantly over time that the end of this becomes much more normal. This is not what we're likely to see in this conflict or in Iran. There's very good fronts on all ends. But I would say there was a little bit of a blow to both Israel and Ukraine this weekend with the death of Senator Lindsey Graham. He was an avid proponent for US military power around the world and had the president's ear while he was doing this. And the fact that he died quite suddenly, I believe, of a tear in his heart, despite having just been to Ukraine. I think he spoke to Zelensky on Friday. That would have been to fortify U.S. support of the Ukrainian situation. And in doing so, the US support for Ukraine is really closely tied to this notion that Europe is going to pick up some of that slack. Of course, Europe have their own reasons for being very, very invested in Ukraine. What I would say is that Ukraine is kind of making its own weather at the moment in terms of how much support they're able to sustain, and they're doing very well. If they can keep up this level of pressure on Russia, they will make some very good strides. But I I really will emphasize that the air war, if you want to call it that, between drones, etc., between Ukraine and Russia is really not the same as the ground war, where Russia still is making progress, even if tiny levels of progress, that is still happening. No one's ever won a war by the air. You know, it's not something that happens. So it's simply this stage or this scale of the war is going very well for Ukraine. They will be able to reap the benefits of that, but it does not signal the end of this war.

SPEAKER_01

As far as these kind of step-by-step updates that we seem to be getting from the Middle East and from the Russia-Ukraine war, it's quite different to what's happening in Myanmar and how many times you hear about it, how frequent it is, and how maybe most people don't fully understand how complicated it is.

SPEAKER_02

The interest in conflicts like Iran and Ukraine, right? The interest is very high because of the countries involved. There's no question of that. And the proximity to all of this kind of major international press. The wars are actually not all that different in the sense that they go by fits and starts, right? They make progress and there's a regression. You make progress and there's a regression. And you've already seen that in both the Ukraine and the Iranian situation, you have to be like a real fiend for it to keep up with all of these things. And so I would actually say the same of a case like Myanmar, which is that it's very consequential. In many ways, it's fascinating about what it says about warfare, especially in the region, but it's not fallen off people's agenda because it's not similar to these wars. It's really because it's just not proximate to them.

SPEAKER_01

Would you agree with that, Sumana? Talk us through the origins and how they were understood at the time.

SPEAKER_00

It's been exposing to conflicts since they gained independence from British colonial rule in the 1940s. So military huntaries fighting war against ethnic armed organizations who wanted far more autonomy in the independent state from the central military governments. So this military huntaries are fighting against either armed groups at different parts of the country for a long time, at least seven or six decades now. So many outsider countries see Myanmar problem as a more domestic problem. It's like unfinished, like longest running civil war rather than a conflict which has regional implications. Since the military coup in 2021, neighboring countries like Thailand, Bangladesh, China, India, they are seeing more conflict spillover affecting their countries and their borders. But we only recently see more strategic regional implications. And then that's when regional countries and leaders started interested in Myanmar conflicts and more involved in resolving Myanmar conflicts.

SPEAKER_01

Because when we look at um how AtCLED formats things, we had a lot of questions towards the end of last year about fragmentation and what role that plays in the dynamics. And obviously, Myanmar is quite fragmented as far as that goes. Would you mind explaining the different actors involved and how that has become what it is today?

SPEAKER_00

So, right now, uh since after the coup in 2021, we are seeing more than thousands of ethnic resistance and groups operating inside Myanmar. It seems like a lot and complicated, but these hundreds of actors mostly fit into two categories. If we want to exclude state army, Myanmar military, and their collaborators are one category. We will have two other categories, which is one anti-coup resistance groups. So these are newer resistance groups. They are mostly comprised of people who join the civil disobedience movement. So students, teachers, university students, and pro-democracy, and other activists. And these groups are full of young people. Many of these groups refer to as deeper defense forces, PDFs, because they emerge in response to the military attacking peaceful protesters soon after 2021. So they form to define local communities for military prostitution and to prevent a weakened military rule and to be able to pressure military out of holidays. So from their primary days, they are fighting for country's democracy. And then we have a dozen of older, more well-established ethnic armed organizations, which I briefly touch on. So they have been fighting for greater autonomy for seven or eight decades. Some of them started since their independence. So they mostly operate in ethnic states and on borders, so in the eastern side with China, and then in southeastern border with Thailand and the west border with Bangladesh and Western North with India. So these ethnic M groups provide training, equipment, and shelter to newer anti-core systems groups. And depending on where these newer anti-core resistance groups are based and operate, they are either aligned with these fields or enabled by the yields. So the copper landscape in general is we are seeing in Yemai's many M groups enter these two categories, joining hands over the common goal of defeating the military. And the you know, better being successful and sub-bats are also depend on how these groups can work together or not.

SPEAKER_02

I have a question for you, Simon. You mentioned, of course, that the situation has changed quite substantially since 2021. There was a very well publicized coup and you know, figures that many people will know from Myanmar had a very difficult time. Perhaps you can explain some of those kind of more public representatives of Myanmar and what's happened to them since. But besides that, I'm wondering about how you would characterize the conflicts since 2021 by year, because it seems to me that there's been a pretty big shift in what that conflict looks like year on year, and we've just come up to an anniversary.

SPEAKER_00

So when the military stage uh the coup, and then they also present the ruling government, state counselor, and the ruling party, lots of them are put in prison. And the country leader and state counselor Asasuji, this Nova Lori, she's also put in prison. In fact, many many people don't know whether she's still alive or not. So the campaigns are concentrated right now, demanding the military to provide any proof of life. So that's how the campaigns also progress over the years. The men in the military leave out of the politics, and now we are seeing the campaigns where we demand the proof of life of our sensitivity. And in times of conflict, uh there's a very significant shift, like at least three conflict tenant points that almost changed the whole political system. So starting from 2022 and late 2023, we are seeing two major developments. One is the use of drones by resistance groups. So, as I mentioned earlier, these newer resistance groups are compared with younger people who grew up in digital age and who's familiar with computer games and drones. So they bring these innovation and adaptation of commercial drones to the battlefield. And that also allows them to gain confidence from the older established EOs and to boost the cooperation between these two armed groups with slightly political objectives. The incorporation of drones actually, of course, inspired by Ukraine-Russian conflict, mostly inspired by the Ukraine innovation of drones and adaptation. So these drones discourage the military troops who are mostly fighting because they are commanded to fight against the resistance group, not because they are willing to. So these drones are really effective in morally uh demoralizing the military troops and shifting the position from defense to offensive. And what combine these technological incorporations is the cooperation between EU's resistance group in very successful operation known as Operation 1027, which was launched in late 2023. So these operations started as operation against scam centers operating in Organ Shan State, but because they are military capable and they started using these achievements to incur into Myanmar center, so more territories, and they've been capturing over 20 times. So these two developments threaten the military because they capture like one third of the country in terms of territories, and they reach so close to the military center, the second capital city of Mandalori, which is so close to the military headquarters. That pushed the military to the edge to come back with the advanced drone technologies, and China also have to step in to throw a lifeline to the military, provide military support, drone technology, air defense systems, training. That includes China being a patron, inviting the military leader in different regional corporations where military leaders also connect with Iran leaders and secure more aviation gas or aviation fuel. So China had to step in and then from there the military, because it had time to reinstitute itself, so it also had time to come back with some counter-offensive.

SPEAKER_02

Can I ask very quickly, Swan, that's super interesting. So who in the 2022-2023 period, when you said that the many, many kind of local resistance groups started to use drones, who provided those drones?

SPEAKER_00

So in the beginning, they could procure these commercial drones very easily from borders. So these drones are actually coming a lot from China. So with the approval of Chinese authorities through Chinese companies. And then they also procured through the Thailand border. But after Operation 1027 really threatened the military existence and beijing really concerned about the collapse of the center because that is not in their strategic interest. They don't want to deal with a lot of M groups across Myanmar to implement an economic project. They prefer to deal with one manageable, predictable leader. So since these resistance groups capture border towns, China responded by shutting down the border gates. So China shut down all the 2D border gates along the Myanmar-China border. Since the resistance group could not buy any more drones or spare parts, or even like the batteries for dual use. So China restricted the imports and exports on the dual use items as well. China also pressured other ethnic armed organizations who are not fighting the military, but very powerful, for example, like United Western Army. This army is the source of weapons and ammunition for most resistance groups. So they also pressure this group not to support any more to resistance groups. So these are amend the Beijing's coercive measures in addition to ceasefire, pressuring Ambus to enter ceasefire with the military to relinquish captured territories back to the military.

SPEAKER_02

That's super interesting. So what we can see here is that the Chinese, just like many other countries around the world, like will do a lot to prevent regional fallout from a multi-actor conflict. I mean, Myanmar really takes it to whole new levels with the multi-actor conflict in the sense that there are hundreds of these groups, of which they've only rarely consolidated in any particular way. So can you talk a little about why are there so many groups? Why can't they get along or not get along and decide kind of on a sequenced political strategy? What do you think is behind it?

SPEAKER_01

Because on that as well, Clean, but wider public, as far as that goes, it's like the idea about having lots of different groups like that is if there are hundreds of groups, then there must be hundreds of agendas as well. But it sounds like there's two kind of clearer sides to this. So what's driving that?

SPEAKER_00

Yeah, so this also related to your first questions about how I would categorize the conflict. So far, since the coup like over the five years, the conflict has been pretty much focusing on the defeating military. So this is the one common goal that both M actors, M ethnic organizations, and anti-co-resistance groups share. But more than that, they have different ideas about especially how we govern this country, what would be the post-conflict governance structure. So anti-co-resistance groups, they would prefer democratic systems and they prefer federal democracy. But among the ethnic armed organizations, some of them agree to federal democracy systems, with of course ethnic states having more power and autonomy. But some ethnic AM groups, they prefer the confederation-like status. So although they agree on the common goal of defeating the military, they don't have agreement or they don't have political settlements among them. And that is the other factor that restricting deeper military cooperation between them. So since Operation 2027, basically these resistance groups have already captured all the rural strategic centers they could, and that is the maximum capacity they could do without having political settlements among them. Because to push inward to the central Myanmar, the central power center, they need a political settlement, which they haven't. So they are independently loosely operating because they lack the post-conflict vision. And that's also another reason that Beijing publicly supported the Kuli Damian line and the military rule. Because Beijing also sees these cracks. Beijing also know that the resistance they have been struggling to unify and to have a political coherence that Beijing needs for Beijing needs political guarantee to protect their investment in Myanmar, billions of dollar project investments in Myanmar. So they don't see that is happening in a resistance side as well. So that's another reason that it's sided with the military.

SPEAKER_02

That's super interesting because I suppose it's very difficult for a government to die by a thousand cuts. You know, it can take way, way, way too long rather than some sort of a fatal blow. But they can't organize enough to get to that fatal blow so they can then have those arguments about democratization and yeah, I'm not looking great. But I guess uh one thing I would like to ask is what is Everyday life like then for people in Myanmar? You know, even if you're in the government or if you're somebody who lives in the rural areas, what is your experience with conflict or change?

SPEAKER_00

I could answer with aquatams, many people in conflict directly affected areas, they're being displaced, and then they've been repeatedly targeted by the military. Sometimes resistance captured this particular town and then because it's strategically important, and then military recapture this territory, and then resistance group trying to recapture. Because of these many territories hand over between military and the resistance group, many of people in that conflict area are exposed to air strikes repeatedly, artillery shelling, drone strikes, and all that. It's even worse because the Iran crisis and the impact on fuel prices and all that. Many people in conflict-affected areas, they cannot move back to the area to start their normal life or even grow farm in the area. But if we look at the urban areas, many of those displayed people either cross the border into other countries or they move to capital cities like Yango Mendeley. And then we are seeing a lot of people who live in these urban centers without enough fuel, electricity, and internet. So they got like eight hours electricity for one day. So the life is very difficult. And because the military also enforced the conscription law in February 2024, and then they've been training 5,000 recruits per intake. And they've completed about 20 training cycles. It means that they have now 100,000 draftees, and like 90% of them are now already operating in the front lines. That also many young people fled the country. So the unemployment and the exodus of young people. The current situation is really bad for Myanmar because UN Savvy already said that one in three people are starving in Myanmar and 3.5 million people are displaced. And according to our data, over 100,000 people are killed in conflict-related incidents. So because of these situations, both resistance groups and both military are also suffering because of this situation. So like Myanmar also, if you remember, Myanmar also experienced the devastating earthquake in March 2025. That also destroyed all the economic base that is supporting for resistance groups. So resistance groups are already dealing with their supplying bases being devastated by earthquake and economic situations. So what we will be seeing in the, let's say, next six months, that conflict might evolve into something beyond fighting for democracy, competition for political system, or it could involve fighting or competition over resources because both resistance and the military, they need resources to fund their military operations and the country is not doing well at the moment.

SPEAKER_01

So when we look at the items that have caught the media's attention to do with the life for everyday people, one of them is about the weaponry itself and how people have moved away from traditional weapons, if you like. And I think one of the phrases used recently in an article by The Guardian was military evades sanctions by using hobbyists' motorized aircraft to bomb civilians in opposition-held territory. So what are we looking at there? I mean, it's it's very well known for drone use. I think that's referenced quite a lot. But then as far as what these other less typical weapons look like.

SPEAKER_00

Thanks for bringing this up, uh Braun, because it's very important. I think Myanmar is the only conflict that military that use paramortars and gyrocopters, these other aircraft in conflict more widely. In the beginning, I suspect that they might be inspired by Hammots, the use of paramotors, but this is becoming more common in Myanmar, and the military are locally producing these paramotors. Okay, according to the data, military is incorporating additional forms of aircrafts like drones, paramotors, and gyrocopters in their campaign. But they are still using airstrike as their main campaign, area campaign, but they are adding additional aircrafts. The most possible reason for these technologies and this use of aircrafts could be that they are now installing the air defense system in their military bases. So because the concern about resistance group attack, like drone attacks, they use this air defense system and the power motors and dial copters, these aircrafts can easily bypass any jamming. So basically, they are protecting themselves with the advanced air defense, and then they are having other additional aircrafts that can bypass their own jamming and can attack resistance groups. So that is one reason they've been using these. And also because military is warring with the whole country, basically. So the conflict happening in 323 townships out of total 330 townships. Only seven townships, we don't see any political violence are remote and isolated area. So because it is warring with the whole country, it requires different kinds of like flexible operational flexibility. Airstrides require comment chain and the bureaucracy. But these operating these paramotors and gyrocopters, they can lower-ranked officer can easily operate. And the effect is like as deadly as airstrikes.

SPEAKER_01

Because when we were talking about Ukraine earlier, Klina, we mentioned that you can't win completely through aerial warfare alone. But then when you look at Myanmar, it's certainly one of the main contributing factors for the huge fatality counts that we're looking at, right?

SPEAKER_02

Certainly, I would say that is that is definitely the case. But I guess, Simona, I would ask you whether the government thinks that they can solve these conflicts. I mean, is it, you know, it it never appears that to me at least that they're working towards a resolution for the post-2021 conflicts or even the pre-21 conflicts. It's more like they're willing to manage the amount of violence by doing these things without it feeling like it was going to affect their survival in power.

SPEAKER_00

I think the issue with the military regime is that it's not they can't resolve this conflict. It's that they don't want to resolve the conflict. So when the former military and the coup leader Mia Lai Bakam assumed presidency in April, he basically issued the ultimatum inviting ethnic armed groups to join the peace talks. So, like the arti made the 100-day peace plan, he called it 100-day peace plan. It would end by the end of July. So he invited only ethnic armed groups and he excluded all the anti-co-resistant groups because he asked them to surrender. He doesn't want to invite for peace talks. But since he issued this 100-day peace plan, what the new military commander-in-chief has been doing is the increasing counter-offensive operations into these ethnic armed organizations, areas and territories. So he invited for the peace talks. At the same time, he's taking military actions to get the upper hand if there is a negotiation and to have a strategy leverage to recapture many territories as much as possible. At the same time, the resistance groups are not saying they don't want to negotiate. Resistance groups are saying that they want to negotiate, but they want to negotiate and have an inclusive dialogue, not excluding hundreds of armed actors, basically. When military exclude PDF from peace talks, they are basically excluding thousands of resistance fighters. So that won't be any peace plan. And at the same time, military resuming the peace talks with other ethnic AM organizations who already had ceasefire with the military. So basically, there are ethnic AM organizations who already have ceasefire with the military. And then some of them, after the coup, some of them basically abandoned the ceasefire plan and they joined the resistance fight. So militaries, on the other hand, the resuming peace jobs with the other ethnic organizations who had the ceasefire. All they've been doing is telling them to secure the border and to secure the border trade, not talk about the political governance or and it's not a political settlement. So Myanmar conflict is complicated, but at the same time, so far it has been all about a political problem. Different actors trying to solve the political problems militarily. So if you want peace, you can talk about political issues, but military hasn't been doing that so far.

SPEAKER_02

What I find really interesting about this is that Myanmar could become one of those states, a bit like Mexico, in which the amount of violence is quite shocking and quite high and takes on all sorts of different dimensions, kind of what you were speaking about, Simone, whether it's a political survival dimension or it's a substitute for politics, or it's mainly economic, but it has a political affiliation or it has a political outcome. And this can continue for decades, you know, because the violence becomes the fuel that keeps the system running, which most people have invested enough in to not want it to change.

SPEAKER_00

Yes, I totally agree. Yeah, this has been the case for Myanmar.

SPEAKER_01

And is that likely to continue then if we were to talk about what is likely to happen next, where the next sort of movement on this is going to be? Is that what you're expecting? Just more of the same?

SPEAKER_00

Yes. So I'm expecting that military might escalate counter-offensive operations to even more pressure on M groups. And then they also have a pressing matter because China is also pushing them to resume all the economic projects, especially economic projects under Baldwin Road Initiative, which would give China direct access to the Indian Ocean because it's more important for China than ever. So they also have these pressing matters to resume economic projects. To do that, the military is likely to even double down on counter-offensive operations to recapture these territories and resume economic projects.

SPEAKER_01

And Klina, on that global stage, when you think about China's role in this, how how kind of key is that?

SPEAKER_02

It's super key. It seems like China really rescued the military as it currently is from some very difficult situations a few years ago, as Sumon mentioned. And they were able to have a successful, I'm putting that in quotes, successful election last year, in part because of China's support. So it's quite obvious that they've become a little bit like a client state to China. And so being that, they will have to pay up. And it sounds like access to the Indian Ocean is the cost. That was great, Suan. Thank you.

SPEAKER_00

Thank you.

SPEAKER_01

You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest with Professor Cleaner Raleigh, brought to you by ACLED, the world's leading source of political violence and protest data. Subscribe so you never miss an episode, and follow us on socials for updates in the meantime.