Conflicts of Interest
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Conflicts of Interest
Is Ethiopia at war again?
Use Left/Right to seek, Home/End to jump to start or end. Hold shift to jump forward or backward.
In this emergency episode, Prof. Clionadh Raleigh and Bron Mills are joined by ACLED Senior Analyst for East Africa Dr Jalale Getachew Birru to unpack the sudden surge in fighting in northern Ethiopia.
What has changed? Who is fighting whom? And is Ethiopia heading back towards full-scale war?
They break down the latest developments in Tigray, the new alliances forming against Abiy Ahmed’s government, and why the fighting cannot be understood in isolation. From Eritrea and Egypt to Saudi Arabia, the UAE and the Houthis, Ethiopia’s conflict is increasingly tied to a much bigger struggle for influence and control around the Red Sea.
This is expert-led conflict analysis connecting what is happening on the ground in Tigray to the regional power struggle that could determine what happens next.
For more conversations like this, subscribe to Conflicts of Interest and watch the full episode on YouTube.
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Ethiopia’s Tigray conflict escalates
SPEAKER_01Conflicts of interest brought to you by ACLED.
SPEAKER_00Hello everybody. Welcome to an emergency episode of Conflicts of Interest. My name is Cleaner Raleigh. I'm here with the lovely Jalale and the lovely Braun. We're going to be talking today about the activity within the Tigray region of Ethiopia, where as of yesterday, there has been a surge of fighting, which is a continuation of what's been happening since August, but represents a new threshold and a new period within this larger conflict, which many people suspect may lead to another outbreak of open war between the federal forces and primarily the TPLF, but also Amhara and some potential Afar forces in the country. Jalale is our resident expert in Ethiopia and I'm sure has some updates as of today.
Fighting spreads across Tigray and Amhara
SPEAKER_03Yes, according to Acclate data, the conflict officially started on the 1st of August when the two sides clashed in the Shararina area. Since then, our data shows that there have been multiple drone strikes accompanied by more clashes, especially near to the western Tugrai from the Takeze River side. What makes it yesterday's incident different is that the intensity of the violence increased. And yesterday there was armored clashes in multiple locations in southern Tugray zone and also in Wagamra zone of Amara region and also North Wallow zone of Amara region. There was also another front at the border between Tigrae and Afar region. That was yesterday. And today's development is that the conflict in southern Tigray, Northern Wallow, and Wagamra has continued and expanded within the northern Wallow zone. We also have information that a new front has been established, which is near to the Tekase River, towards the Western Tukai. We are currently trying to identify the specific location. The intensity has increased and it seems like it's the same level of violence that we have witnessed in June, July 2021, when the TDF at that time decided to push through Afar and the Amhara region. That's the update when it comes to the military wise. And when it comes to involving the leaders, TPLF and so on, there are rumors that there is also internal dispute within the top leaders of TPLEF at this moment. For example, we have a confirmed information that the head of the Tigray police force, which is also one of the top uh members of TPL, who was also a general during the 2020 to 2022 war, has decided to defect to the federal government side. And there's also another rumor that the top leaders of the Western Tugray side of TDF has been suspended. But we are trying to confirm that as well.
What has changed in Ethiopia?
SPEAKER_00So one of the things I would say is that, like in the previous war, which garnered quite a lot of international attention just for Braun's benefit, there was always lots of rumors about splits within the TPLF and massive amounts of dissension, if you will, between the forces organized against the government and many of these areas that are currently active were also active during that conflict. Some very similar, if not repeated, lines of contestation. And we know how that ended. So it's the big question is what's new?
SPEAKER_02I think it's what's really interesting from where I'm sat is we usually start these episodes with uh a What in the World, and we have a look around the headlines. And today, Reuters, BBC, Al Jazeera, AP, and elsewhere and New York Times, they've all gone with this story in their headlines as their lead story. And so from earlier when we spoke this week, Cleaner, where the news was mainly around the seven groups coming together, and we unpicked that. What's changed between then and now and why has this captured the world's attention as it has?
Eritrea, the TPLF and the wider regional stakes
SPEAKER_00I would say that the most important thing to consider about this conflict at the moment is not necessarily whether the government can take on the TPLF, right? They certainly can. That is not the biggest issue here. And it's not even that they've allied themselves with their, you know, previous enemies, which is something that is certainly a challenge, but nothing that also isn't possible. There's two things that we really need to keep our eyes on. The first is that Ethiopians that I've spoken to yesterday were incredibly concerned because the TPLF is now allied with the government of Eritrea, which had previously been under sanctions by the US because of their activity in the previous Tigrae War when they were allied with the government. Now, this means that the Eritrean government can buy arms. And the concern is that despite the fact that the TPLF has been sanctioned by the US as of earlier this year, if there is a way for them to get considerable arms into the country, that they represent a more formidable threat to the government and to the people of Ethiopia. And some people were worried last night about the possibility of drone strikes in Otis. The other thing that really concerns me is that the reason that there is so much blatant kind of international rumors about these things happening is that the Red Sea, which of course both Eritrea, Ethiopia, Somalia, you know, Yemen, and Saudi Arabia are all kind of in a contest over in some ways about control for that area. That is really at the backdrop of what's happening here. So the reason that Eritrea has had these sanctions removed is clearly either because Egypt or Saudi Arabia has asked the US to do it so that the Eritreans could provide more support in an anti-Huthi, let's say, alliance in the Red Sea. However, that upsets Ethiopia, which is in an alliance with UAE and Israel, and of course Somaliland. And the contest for that region is not going to be one group against the other. There's also a third group here. And it represents, in many ways, a cauldron of subnational, national, international, and global concerns, all of which are in
Who is fighting whom?
SPEAKER_00that area.
SPEAKER_02So with the backdrop as it is, remind us the different kind of sides to this. Because when there's conversations still ongoing about the Houthi backdrop and whatever else, and so there's alignments going on within the region of the horde that are particularly important on there that it's quite clear siding, if you like.
SPEAKER_03Internally, for example, in today's and yesterday's conflict, the ENDF, the Ethiopian military, the Tigray Peace Forces, the Amhara Anti-Riyot Forces, police forces, and local militias are on one side, while the TDF, the Tigray Defense Forces, is together with the Amhara Fanlo National Movement, RFN, and they are fighting with the government. The two are part of the new alliances which was established on Sunday. In other parts of the region, we are keeping an eye if the other members of the alliances have started some kind of coordinated operation. So far, there is no news. So locally, this is the composition we have of actors, but neighboring wise, I will give Klina
The Red Sea’s competing alliances
SPEAKER_03to add on that.
SPEAKER_00So we did a podcast many months ago about the competition between Saudi and UAE and how that was playing out in the horn. But I would just generally say what you have at the moment is a combination of Eritrea and by association, the TPLF, because they are anti-Abi. So there's kind of an anti-Abi, let's say, coalition. Egypt is certainly a member of that, and in many ways has been pulling those strings very against the Abi government. To some degree, but lightly, I would say Al-Burhan in Sudan is a member of that group, although I think that generally the Sudanese are trying to stay out of this because they have their own problems. So you've got that combination, but you also have Abi Ahmed who's made it very clear he needs sea access. And that has led him to recognize Somaliland's claim for independence, which has infuriated Somalia, in some ways, put Somalia in combination with Eritrea, Egypt, Somalia, Saudi Arabia together against Ethiopia, Israel, UAE, and Somaliland. So they are, in combination, not necessarily agreeing with each other about the future of that region, but they have a much bigger threat right at their doorstep, which is the Houthis, which of course have an alliance with Iran. And so that combination of immediate threats versus more, let's say, down the road threats is going to be playing out within this region, and it's not going to be next week, but I would imagine that there will be quite a long-standing feud between those parties.
Is Ethiopia at war again?
SPEAKER_02So when we're looking at Ethiopia, is it fair to say that Ethiopia is at war again? Or are we heading in that direction?
SPEAKER_00No, I wouldn't I wouldn't go that far.
SPEAKER_03What do you think, Julale? What do you mean by war? Yeah. Is another question. Because there have been violence since 2019, and this violence escalated between 2020 and 2022. That's a war, the Northern Ethiopia war. And then since then it has decreased, but the violence has continued. For example, in our region, a new round of violence started in 2023. So this is like another new round of violence happening in the country, which could make or break the country as well, depending on who is involved, actively involved. But I don't see it's at the same level as we have seen in 2020-2022 because of the group alliances, the available weapons, and also the support internally and externally as well.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I would agree with that in the sense that, you know, the the war in Tigray, which was instigated by an attack by the TPLF forces on several bases within the North, resulted in a state of emergency declared the day afterwards by the government in Addis. And they're not any closer to doing that. I mean, the TPLF have been making trouble in Tigrae, you know, during the war, past the war, etc. They showed real concern about what was happening when they were unable to prevent it from spreading out of Tigrae. And of course, that's why these alliances, especially with the Amhara and the Oromo factions, are so worrying. But at the moment, we've not seen, let's say, a concurrent rise in conflict in Amhara, although it's a continuation from what's Jalali mentioned, has been going on now for several years. And in uh Otomia, where the OLA have flared and then gone down. But I will say one of the really important parts of understanding Ethiopia's conflicts more broadly is that they get very complicated very quickly because everybody is always switching the sides that they're fighting on, either temporarily or splinters or whatever the case. So, for example, some, if I'm not mistaken, Jalale, some members of the OLA were fighting with the government. In fact, that's been a long-standing accusation about the activities within the Aroma region, that they were in fact fighting with the government against the Amharans, which they now claim to be in an alliance with. So not everything is as it appears.
Why alliances in Ethiopia are so fluid
SPEAKER_03Yeah, not the official members of the OLA, but the former members of OLA who decided to return to peaceful life, but who now again raised up their arms because of the continued attacks from Fano militias in western Oromia. And these former members of OLA are fighting alongside with the security forces against FANLO. So this means, in other words, they might also fight against OLA if the Oromo population around that area is being affected by the OLA. But we are keeping an eye on this as well.
SPEAKER_00And I would say that more broadly, like the whole situation is fluid, both within these regions, within this conflict, within the broader region about who's going to act when and when is diplomacy being used, or when is negotiation, when is force. It's all going to be incredibly fluid.
SPEAKER_03Yes, and one needs also to keep an eye on the supporters. When the alliances was announced on Sunday, all the supporters of OLA, most the most supporters of OLA, the final supporters, were against the alliance. It was very loud and clear, those within Ethiopia, as well as on social media and so on. So that also matters how these actors move forward, whether they will continue collaborating with TPLF and so on. For now, maybe they might they might be quiet. We are the second day, they might be quiet and they might say, let's wait and see how TPLF progresses. And then depending on that, they might either join or abandon the alliances. So this is not the first time such alliances happened. So we are keeping an eye on
What happens next?
SPEAKER_03that.
SPEAKER_02And it sounds quite open-ended, but if you had to have a sort of educated guess about what you expect to happen next, is it is it even worth doing?
SPEAKER_00I don't expect it to go back to, let's say, a quiet, low-intensity conflict. I think there's too many interests now. And it kind of kickstart something that, like I said, goes well beyond the contest integrai or over the disputed regions, which have been disputed now, you know, for over six years. No, it's gonna go well beyond that. The question is, what are the breaks in this system to prevent it from escalating even further? I don't see them at the moment. I would imagine that the only breaks I can see at the moment are midterm elections in the US and the Israeli elections. That may change some of the dynamics a bit, and of course what the Saudis choose to do about the Houthis, but at the moment they're fighting. Jalale, do you have any sort of anticipation of what might happen next?
Can the new alliance remove the government?
SPEAKER_03Anticipation. So from where I'm sitting right now, I don't see the alliances being successful in removing the government. And if somehow they manage to remove the government somehow, I don't see the country being stable because they don't have the same ideology. They are enemies. One exists because the other one existed. They were created to fight each other. That's their ideology. So nobody knows how they will work together and form a new government. But there is a very low chance for these members of alliances to remove the government. But as Klina said, there might be a continuous high level of violence across multiple regions, but this is not new. It was there previously as well. And the government uh passed through
The political cost of Ethiopia’s recurring conflicts
SPEAKER_03it.
SPEAKER_00Yeah, I would say that Abi Ahmed is not in a bad position at the moment. He's not in a particularly weak position. Although I think the people in Ethiopia are quite tired of these recurring conflicts as they move around the state. And that's been a problem that they've not managed to really deal with the impetus to go to conflict with the federal government. That's based on a lot of things, a lot of the political geography of the of the state. But he has not succeeded in that. He's not succeeded in medemat or any sort of bringing together of of the different interests in the country. And that's going to this has a huge cost for him, including these conflicts.
Tracking the conflict with ACLED data
SPEAKER_02Okay, great. Well, thank you both for the update. And then I suppose we'll speak again soon before long. But might be worth mentioning the accolade alerts that we've got on this as we continue to watch it quite closely, that will be updated daily as we go ahead.
SPEAKER_00That sounds perfect. We'll also, of course, have a full webinar just about this that has been planned now for a few weeks. So we were being very pressing. Yeah, so we all have that to look forward to and a lot
Ethiopia enters a new year as violence escalates
SPEAKER_00to go through. A lot to go through. Yeah. Yeah. Anyway, yeah, it's like it was six years ago. In fact, very funny, but the Ethiopian government has this new ad campaign. Have you seen it, Joali, where they were like, come to Ethiopia where it's 2019, because the Ethiopian calendar is several years earlier than the than our seven years. Yeah. Than our Gregorian calendar. So they were saying, come come where it's 2019, and there's been no COVID, and of course there's been no growing war.
SPEAKER_03Well, there has been, but we just celebrated our 2019 on September 9-11. September 11 is our new year. So we just entered a new year, and this uh new development happened after a week. So yeah. Yeah.
SPEAKER_01It's a shame. You've been listening to Conflicts of Interest with Professor Cleaner Raleigh, brought to you by ACLED, the world's leading source of political violence and protest data. Subscribe so you never miss an episode, and follow us on socials for updates in the meantime.